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Gaining economic benefits from substantially lower labor 
costs has been reported as a major reason for offshoring 
labor-intensive information systems services to low-wage 
countries. However, if wage differences are so high, why is 
there such a high level of variation in the economic success 
between offshored IS projects? This study argues that 
offshore outsourcing involves a number of extra costs for the 
^his paper was recommended for acceptance by Associate Guest Editor 
Erran Carmel. 
client organization that account for the economic failure of 
offshore projects. The objective is to disaggregate these extra 
costs into their constituent parts and to explain why they 
differ between offshored software projects. The focus is on 
software development and maintenance projects that are 
offshored to Indian vendors. A theoretical framework is 
developed a priori based on transaction cost economics 
(TCE) and the knowledge-based view of the firm, comple 
mented by factors that acknowledge the specific offshore 
context The framework is empirically explored using a 
multiple case study design including six offshored software 
projects in a large German financial service institution. The 
results of our analysis indicate that the client incurs post 
contractual extra costs for four types of activities: (1) re 
quirements specification and design, (2) knowledge transfer, 
(3) control, and (4) coordination. In projects that require a 
high level of client-specific knowledge about idiosyncratic 
business processes and software systems, these extra costs 
were found to be substantially higher than in projects where 
more general knowledge was needed. Notably, these costs 
most often arose independently from the threat of oppor 
tunistic behavior, challenging the predominant TCE logic of 
market failure. Rather, the client extra costs were parti 
cularly high in client-specific projects because the effort for 
managing the consequences of the knowledge asymmetries 
between client and vendor was particularly high in these 
projects. Prior experiences of the vendor with related client 
projects were found to reduce the level of extra costs but 
could not fully offset the increase in extra costs in highly 
client-specific projects. Moreover, cultural and geographic 
distance between client and vendor as well as personnel 
turnover were found to increase client extra costs. Slight 
evidence was found, however, that the cost-increasing impact 
of these factors was also leveraged in projects with a high 
level of required client-specific knowledge (moderator effect). 
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Introduction ^ ^ H 
Offshore outsourcing of information systems has seen con 
siderable growth during the past years, especially in the 
domain of application services. Aside from getting access to 
skilled and qualified resources, reaping benefits from sub 
stantially lower labor costs has been reported as one of the 
major reasons for offshoring (Apte et al. 1997; Khan et al. 
2003; Rottman and Lacity 2004; Schaaf 2004; Sobol and Apte 
1995). Similar to domestic outsourcing, however, there are 
indications that the expected economic benefits are not always 
achieved. While realized cost savings through offshore out 
sourcing may range between 20 and 50 percent, studies also 
show that in about 50 percent of the cases offshore projects 
fail to achieve cost savings or that costs actually increase 
(Hatch 2004; Schaaf 2004). Obviously there are situations 
where a number of "extra costs" arise in offshore outsourcing 
that can offset the client's expected cost savings from lower 
labor costs in low-wage countries (Carmel and Tija 2005, 
p. 40). 
While attempts have been made to identify and categorize 
extra offshore cost items (Carmel and Tija 2005; Overby 
2003), there is still little knowledge about the sources of their 
magnitude (i.e., how much of these extra costs should be cal 
culated into the business case of a particular offshore project). 
Whenever different types of extra costs, such as transaction 
costs (e.g., initiation, contracting, and control costs), were 
distinguished in previous studies, little attempt was made to 
explain why those costs may differ between particular off 
shore projects (Carmel and Nicholson 2005). Variations in 
project performance were predominantly examined from the 
vendor rather than the client side. For example, it was found 
that vendor performance metrics such as project effort, 
elapsed time, and software rework are contingent on a number 
of project characteristics such as the use of standardized 
processes and prior experiences of the vendor personnel 
(Gopal et al. 2002). Moreover, it is not clear how the offshore 
outsourcing context (i.e., the fact that an IS function is out 
sourced to another country) actually influences the economic 
success of an offshore project. Although some studies identi 
fied various types of risks or challenges associated with off 
shore outsourcing, such as cultural differences, geographic 
distance, or regulatory/legal differences (Apte et al. 1997; 
Carmel and Agarwal 2002; Khan et al. 2003; Kliem 2004; 
Ramarapu and Parzinger 1997), there is still little under 
standing about the relationships between these offshore 
specific challenges and further economic risks, such as extra 
costs. The fact that offshore regions, such as China and India, 
were found to differ in transaction costs (Qu and Brocklehurst 
2003), however, clearly indicates that the magnitude of extra 
costs is influenced by offshore-specific factors. 
When examining the emergent literature on IS offshoring, it 
is also striking that the majority of research has focused on 
how to best manage offshore projects (Carmel and Agarwal 
2001; Gopal et al. 2003; Heeks et al. 2001; Kliem 2004; 
Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and Sahay 2001). While these 
studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of how to 
address some of the offshore-specific challenges, little recog 
nition has been given to the alignment of management prac 
tices to specific project properties, which may lead to the 
impression that virtually any type of service can successfully 
be outsourced offshore if only the appropriate management 
techniques are applied. This view is in stark contrast to 
research findings from domestic outsourcing, which empha 
size that beyond the downstream importance of managing the 
relationship with the vendor, the decision on what to out 
source has important implications for relationship manage 
ment practices and outsourcing success (Grover et al. 1996; 
Lacity and Willcocks 1998). 
As offshore outsourcing2 is actually a "buy" strategy with a 
vendor located in a country different from that of the client 
(Carmel and Tjia 2005, p. 103), research on offshoring can 
fruitfully build on these insights from research on domestic 
outsourcing. The most applied theoretical lens to examine the 
linkage between the properties of IS functions and the econo 
mic efficiency of outsourcing has been transaction cost econo 
mics (TCE) (Dibbern et al. 2004). The sole recognition of 
TCE for explaining the conditions of market efficiency, how 
ever, has come under scrutiny more recently. In particular, 
the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm has been sug 
gested as a complementary stream of reasoning (Conner and 
Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996). It acknowledges the fact that 
knowledge is heterogeneously distributed across firms and 
that the management of knowledge asymmetries between 
client and vendor can lead to extra costs for the client organi 
zation, independent of vendor opportunism. Accordingly, our 
study attempts to build on both TCE and KBV to explain 
variations in extra offshoring costs, expanding both perspec 
tives with offshore-specific factors. The focus of our analysis 
The decision of "buy versus build" is inherent in any type of offshoring 
strategy (Carmel and Tjia 2005, pp. 103 ff). While buy refers to offshore 
outsourcing or out-tasking to third parties, a build strategy implies ownership 
of offshore resources, such as in captive centers or subsidiaries. Hybrid 
arrangements such as joint ventures also exist. 
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is set on software development and maintenance projects. 
Both the development and maintenance of software are labor 
intensive tasks and hence are most likely to be offshored from 
the portfolio of IS functions (Hirschheim et al. 2004). Having 
set the focus of this study, our research objective can be 
summarized by the following research questions: 
1. What types of extra costs may arise for the client in off 
shored software projects ? 
2. How and why do these client extra costs vary between 
offshored software projects T 
In the next section, we will provide the theoretical foundation 
for studying these research questions. An a priori framework 
will be developed to serve as a basis for analyzing the extra 
costs of a number of software projects that are offshored to 
Indian vendors by a leading German financial services 
provider. From our theoretical and empirical reflections, we 
are able to derive a refined theoretical understanding of the 
composition of client extra costs and their main drivers. 
Moreover, based on our findings, implications for research are 
outlined and final conclusions are drawn. 
Theoretical Foundation ^ i 
The theoretical framework of this study is built on the com 
plementary theoretical perspectives of TCE and KBV. These 
two theories of the firm are complemented by offshore 
specific factors that are derived from existing literature on the 
international division of labor. Figure 1 presents a graphical 
illustration of this framework. 
The framework essentially suggests that offshore outsourcing 
is associated with a number of extra costs for the client that go 
beyond the contract-based payments to the vendor. These 
extra costs arise for activities such as controlling vendor per 
formance, coordinating project resources, transferring knowl 
edge to vendor personnel, as well as specifying software 
requirements. Based on TCE and KBV, it is argued that the 
level of extra costs for the client critically depends on the 
degree of required client-specific knowledge as well as the 
vendor's absorptive capacity. Moreover, offshore-specific 
client-vendor distance may also lead to increased costs on the 
client side. The influential role of these specific offshore 
The goal of our study is to explain variations in extra costs between off 
shored software projects. Therefore, we focus on a comparison of different 
offshored software projects; we do not intend to compare offshored projects 
to in-house projects or domestic outsourcing projects. 
barriers as well as the impact of the vendor's absorptive capa 
city is influenced (i.e., moderated) by the degree of required 
client-specific knowledge. The discussion below elaborates 
upon each of the key constructs and relationships. 
Decomposing Client Extra Costs 
Before elaborating on the specific cost categories that arise 
for the client during the process of offshore outsourcing 
(research question 1), it is necessary to define the broad term 
extra costs. Extra costs are defined as all costs in terms of 
time, effort, and resources spent by the client organization 
that go beyond the actual payments to the vendor, that is, 
beyond compensating the vendor's costs plus paying the 
vendor's profit margin (Carmel and Tija 2005, p. 40).4 The 
payments to the vendor could either be specified in a fixed 
price contract or accounted for in a time and material contract 
(Rottman and Lacity 2004). Occasionally, it comes to con 
tract adaptations during an outsourcing relationship, which 
may lead to additional payments to the vendor. In addition to 
contract-based payments, however, the client's extra costs for 
managing an offshore project need to be taken into account. 
These extra costs can gradually offset the cost savings from 
lower payments to offshore vendors (see Figure 2; if extra 
costs increase, cost savings go down or costs may even 
become higher than before offshore outsourcing). 
Quite often, these extra costs are underestimated when it 
comes to offshoring application services (Carmel and Tija 
2005; Overby 2003; Rottman and Lacity 2004). Extra costs 
for the client can arise for a number of activities.5 These acti 
vities can be separated into three phases: the pre-contractual 
phase, the transition phase, and the service delivery phase (see 
Figure 3). The focus of our study will be on non-contractual 
costs that arise for the client organization during the transition 
and delivery phase. As such, the focus is set on the costs for 
requirements specification and design, knowledge transfer, 
control, and coordination. An overview of the relevant cost 
categories and their definitions is presented in Table 1. 
Extra costs have also been referred to as "remaining or new costs after 
outsourcing" (Lancellotti et al. 2003, p. 134) or they have been labeled as 
"hidden costs" (Barthelemy 2001; Overby 2003). 
5It should be noted that the calculation of costs based on the underlying 
activities of these costs equals the fundamentals of activity-based costing 
(see Lammers et al. 2004). 
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Table 1. Definition of Extra Cost Categories 
Cost Category Definition Source 
Specification costs Client costs associated with the process of explaining and defining what Based on Sommerville 
services are required from the system and identifying the constraints on (2004, p. 75) 
systems operation and development. 
Design costs Client costs associated with the "description of the structure of the soft- Sommerville (2004, p. 76) 
ware to be implemented, the data which is part of the system, the inter 
faces between the system components, and, sometimes, algorithms used." 
Knowledge transfer Costs associated with the communication of knowledge from the client Based on Ko et al. (2005, 
costs organization so that it is learned and applied by the offshore vendor. p. 62) 
Coordination costs Costs for integrating and linking together client and vendor resources to Based on Van de Ven et 
accomplish a collective set of tasks. al. (1976, p. 322) 
Control costs Costs for ensuring that the vendor acts and performs in a manner that is Based on Choudhury and 
consistent with achieving the desired objectives of the client. Sabherwal (2003, p. 292) 
Requirements Specification and Design and 
Knowledge Transfer Costs 
For understanding these extra costs, it is important to consider 
the nature of the task that is delegated from the client to the 
offshore vendor. Software development and maintenance are 
both labor intensive tasks (Boehm 1987; De Marco and Lister 
1987). Both can be characterized as 
the processing of knowledge in a very focused 
way...moving from the knowledge application 
domain to software architectural and algorithmic 
design knowledge, and ending in programming 
language statements (Robillard 1999, p. 92). 
In broad terms, the required knowledge that needs to be 
processed can be separated into two spheres: 
" 
(1) knowledge 
about the application problem domain and (2) technical 
knowledge through which a software solution is developed" 
(Tiwana 2003, p. 259; see also Tiwana 2004). 
Offshore outsourcing, like domestic outsourcing, implies a 
contract-based separation of the sources of both types of 
knowledge (Beath and Walker 1998; Tiwana 2003). The 
application domain knowledge usually resides on the client 
side. The client continually produces new application domain 
knowledge which reflects its constantly changing business 
requirements. While it is necessary for the client to keep a 
certain level of technical understanding (e.g., architectural 
knowledge) when outsourcing an IS function to an external 
vendor, the majority of the technological knowledge is the 
responsibility of the vendor. Accordingly, offshore out 
sourcing brings about the challenge of integrating both types 
of knowledge (Beath and Walker 1998; Tiwana 2003). 
Knowledge integration can be achieved in a twofold way 
(Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 485). First, the client could 
transfer his application domain knowledge to the vendor. 
This would include the transfer of knowledge about the busi 
ness processes and the user information needs that are to be 
reflected by the software application. Moreover, the vendor 
has to gain a solid understanding of the client's existing 
technical infrastructure including source and target appli 
cations of the software application which is to be developed 
or maintained. Having adopted the necessary client domain 
knowledge, the vendor would then be able to specify the 
major functional requirements as well as to perform the 
design, coding, implementation, and testing. Second, the 
client could take over the majority of the requirements speci 
fication (or even the design). This form of knowledge 
integration may be referred to as knowledge substitution 
(Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 485), since the vendor can 
work primarily from the detailed specifications (or even 
software design) of the client without the need to fully 
understand the application domain background.6 
Knowledge-substitution is a fundamental response to 
cognitive limitations, having the effect of econo 
mizing on them. Knowledge substitution expands 
Y's [the vendor's] productive capability without 
requiring fully concomitant knowledge absorption 
by Y (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 485). 
Demsetz argues: "Direction substitutes for education (that is for the transfer 
of knowledge itself)" (Demsetz 1988, p. 157). Specification may also be 
viewed as a form of "direction" for the subsequent tasks in the software life 
cycle. 
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Both activities, knowledge transfer and specification (or even 
design), require the client to invest time, effort, and resources 
leading to knowledge transfer and specification costs. They 
have also been referred to as complementary procedural 
coordination strategies that need to be balanced out in any 
interorganizational relationship for product development in 
general (Sobrero and Roberts 2001), as well as in offshore 
outsourcing of application development and maintenance in 
particular (Mirani 2007). Typically, a transition phase is 
agreed upon in offshore outsourcing. In this transition phase, 
key vendor personnel stay onshore for a certain period of time 
to enable the transfer of knowledge from the client to the 
vendor (Mirani 2007; Tiwana 2004). In addition, the vendor 
personnel can work out the functional specifications with the 
client in a collaborative way (Heeks et al. 2001; Krishna et al. 
2004). The initial specification of requirements often needs 
to be modified or complemented during the actual service 
delivery phase, leading to re-specification costs (Apte 1990). 
Moreover, additional knowledge transfer is likely to occur 
during the service delivery phase (Mirani 2007). 
Control and Coordination Costs 
Two additional types of extra costs that typically arise in 
interorganizational relationships such as offshore outsourcing 
are the costs for coordinating the offshore project and the 
costs for controlling the vendor's performance. Both control 
and coordination have been identified as two important 
activities in the management of software projects, in general 
(Banker et al. 2006; Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 
1997), as well as in offshore software projects, in particular 
(Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006). Although the two types of 
costs are interrelated in that "improved coordination helps in 
the exercise of control while effective control may improve 
coordination" (Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006, p. 190), they 
represent two distinct concepts (Benslimane et al. 2005; 
Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006; White and Lui 2005). 
Control is the mechanism through which the client ensures 
that the vendor performs adequately. This could be achieved 
both through output control (e.g., through checking the 
quality of the software solution provided by the vendor) and 
behavior control (e.g., through observing how the onshore or 
offshore personnel of the vendor are actually performing their 
work) (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1997; Ouchi 1979). Both 
activities lead to control costs for the client. 
Coordination costs are the costs for integrating and linking 
together client and vendor resources to accomplish the collec 
tive task of software development or maintenance (based on 
Van de Ven et al. 1976, p. 322). This includes the distribu 
tion of work across project members, ensuring that every team 
member knows how her or his work is related to the work of 
other team members. Proper procedures and infrastructure 
must also be available for exchange between the members of 
the offshore project, including client personnel and onshore 
and offshore staff of the vendor. Closely related to the notion 
of coordination?as defined in this study?is the concept of 
cooperation, which has also been suggested to be different 
from control (White and Lui 2005). Cooperation captures the 
necessity of "social integration" that is "necessary in order for 
partners to combine resources and integrate their activities in 
the course of undertaking a joint task" (White and Lui 2005, 
p. 914). Thus, if the client has to invest in team building for 
social integration between client and vendor staff (Das and 
Teng 2001), this would be an indication of high cooperation 
(i.e., coordination costs). 
In human systems, on the other hand, the motiva 
tions, incentives, and emotions of people are often 
extremely complex, and understanding them is usu 
ally an important part of coordination (Malone and 
Crowston 1994, p. 91). 
Having categorized and defined the types of extra costs that 
may arise in offshored software projects (research question 1), 
we will theorize on the drivers of variations in the magnitude 
of extra costs between different offshored software projects 
(research question 2). We will do so by deriving propositions 
from two complementary theoretical perspectives: TCE and 
KBV. 
Transaction Cost Economics 
The roots of TCE date back to Coase (1937) who argued that 
firms exist because using the market is costly. This basic 
argument has been picked up by Williamson (1975, 1985) in 
his development of TCE. The main objective of TCE is to 
identify the conditions under which market governance (e.g., 
outsourcing) is more cost efficient than governance within the 
boundaries of a firm (i.e., insourcing). 
The main hypothesis out of which transaction cost 
economics works is this: Firms seek to align trans 
actions, which differ in their attributes, with govern 
ance structures, which differ in their costs and com 
petencies, in a discriminating (mainly transaction 
costs economizing) way (Williamson 1991, p. 79). 
Thus, the main focus of TCE is on minimizing transaction 
costs, which can be defined as all costs in terms of time, 
effort, and money spent, that arise for "planning, adapting, 
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and monitoring task completion under alternative governance 
structures" (Williamson 1981, p. 552). The notion of plan 
ning and adapting refers to pre-contractual activities as well 
as contract adaptations (see Figure 3), which are not the focus 
of our study. The concept of monitoring, however, is 
reflected by the concept of control. Accordingly, we will 
subsequently use the term control costs equally to that of 
transaction costs. According to TCE, the existence of control 
costs is based on two fundamental behavioral assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that economic actors are boundedly 
rational (based on Simon 1957). Accordingly, contracts can 
only be settled incompletely since "it is impossible to deal 
with complexity in all contractually relevant aspects" 
(Williamson 1981, p. 554). The incompleteness of contracts 
would not matter if the contractual partners were completely 
trustworthy ("stewardship behavior," Williamson 1975, 
p. 26). This, however, is ruled out by a second assumption. 
It is assumed that some actors behave opportunistically, 
which means that they cunningly take advantage of oppor 
tunities at the expense of others?also referred to as "self 
interest seeking with guile" (Williamson 1981, p. 554). It is 
assumed that it is hard, or indeed impossible, to anticipate 
another person's attitude toward opportunism, which likely 
leads to opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985, p. 64). 
Accordingly, control costs arise in order to safeguard against 
opportunistic behavior of an exchange partner. 
The effort for safeguarding against such vendor opportunism, 
however, is not meant to be constant across any type of mar 
ket transaction (i.e., outsourcing relationship). Transaction 
costs are proposed to depend on various contingencies, such 
as asset specificity, site specificity, uncertainty, and frequency 
(Williamson 1981). From these four contingencies, asset 
specificity was found to have the most consistent explanatory 
power in a wide range of empirical applications of TCE. This 
was confirmed both in reviews of non-IS disciplines 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997), as well as in a specific litera 
ture review on studies of IS outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, the empirical validity of TCE was found to be 
particularly high when asset specificity was operationalized 
in terms of human asset specificity rather than physical or 
technological specificity. In contrast, the impact of uncer 
tainty was found to be very limited, that is, inconsistent 
(Dibbern et al. 2004; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Site 
specificity appears to be relevant in physical production 
settings, while frequency has rarely been investigated? 
presumably because this would require the observation of 
transactions over time, which is very demanding to achieve in 
empirical studies. 
This study, therefore, focuses on human asset specificity as 
the main predictor variable from TCE. Human assets refer to 
special characteristics of the professionals that are involved in 
developing and maintaining software applications. In parti 
cular, they refer to different kinds of knowledge sets that are 
required to perform an activity. According to Williamson 
(1981, p. 563), it is the nature of knowledge that matters when 
differentiating between highly and less specific human assets. 
Applied to the IS outsourcing context, human asset specificity 
may hence be referred to as client-specific knowledge,7 the 
degree to which the development or maintenance work of a 
software project requires a significant amount of under 
standing of and knowledge about unique work procedures and 
business processes as well as unique software systems of the 
client organization (Beath and Walker 1998; Dibbern et al. 
2005). If the provision of an IS function requires knowledge 
that is very client-specific, the vendor has to invest a lot of 
time and resources in order to adopt this unique knowledge. 
The vendor, therefore, has to make a client-specific invest 
ment. According to TCE, this necessity increases the 
vendor' s propensity to behave opportunistically, because such 
a specific investment would prevent the vendor from realizing 
economies of scale by using the same resources (employees 
and adopted knowledge) in alternative production scenarios 
(i.e., with other customers). Opportunistic behavior could, for 
example, take the form of under-investing in the project or 
using employees that were contracted for the client in other 
vendor accounts without informing the client. This behavior 
could result in low service and product quality (i.e., poor 
software quality) or project delays (Barney 1999, p. 139). In 
order to safeguard against opportunistic behavior and its 
negative consequences, the client would invest in constantly 
monitoring both the vendor's process of software devel 
opment and maintenance as well as the output (e.g., by 
checking the quality of the vendor's functional specifications 
or software design, as well as intermediary releases or proto 
types). This leads to increased control costs. 
Complementary to control, the client could increase its 
coordination effort. As stated earlier, control and coordi 
nation are interrelated. Coordination enables control and vice 
versa (Kumar and Seth 1998). Higher investments into coor 
dination could reduce the vendor's propensity toward oppor 
tunism. A number of authors have suggested that trust may 
serve as an antipode of opportunism (e.g., Chiles and 
McMackin 1996; Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Joshi and Stump 
1999; Noorderhaven 1996). Chiles and McMackin (1996, p. 
88) conclude that the "inclusion of the social-context variable 
of trust in the TCE framework will yield a model with greater 
predictive validity." As coordination increases the level of 
Related concepts are context-specific knowledge (Sabherwal and Becerra 
Fernandez 2005) and knowledge specificity (Choudhury and Sampler 1997). 
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trust between client and vendor personnel, the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior is reduced (Ouchi 1980, p. 134). This 
is particularly likely when the client invests in cooperation 
enhancing activities, such as team building and socializing 
between client and vendor personnel. Notably, this form of 
coordination has also been referred to as clan control (Ouchi 
1979). It focuses on developing "shared values, beliefs, and 
goals among members so that appropriate behaviors will be 
reinforced and rewarded" (Das and Teng 2001, p. 259). Since 
the threat of opportunistic behavior is conceivably high in 
cases of high asset specificity (i.e., when a lot of client-speci 
fic knowledge is required for the development and main 
tenance work), coordination costs are expected to increase. 
It is important to note that the argument is not that client 
specific knowledge leads to more opportunistic behavior, but 
rather that in the case of high asset specificity, vendor oppor 
tunistic behavior leads to more extra costs. This observation 
leads to the following propositions. 
Proposition 1: The higher the level of required 
client-specific knowledge in an offshored software 
project, the higher are the client's costs for (a) 
control and (b) coordination in order to safeguard 
against the threat and presence of opportunistic 
behavior of the vendor. 
Knowledge-Based View of the Firm 
The knowledge-based view (KBV) is a theoretical perspective 
originating from the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
(Grant 1996). Based on the RBV, which views the firm as a 
collection of productive resources (Barney 1991; Penrose 
1959; Wernerfelt 1984), the KBV considers knowledge as the 
critical input in production and as the primary source of value 
of the firm (Grant 1996, p. 112). Based on the assumption of 
bounded rationality, this view concludes that "cognitive 
limitations prohibit individuals from possessing identical 
stocks of knowledge" (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 478). 
Since each organization has its unique set of human resources, 
it follows that each organization possesses a unique repository 
of knowledge, thus leading to knowledge asymmetry between 
firms. Accordingly, it has been argued that the vertical 
boundaries of firms "may be analyzed in terms of relative 
efficiency of knowledge utilization" (Grant 1996, p. 119). 
The explicit consideration of the economic implications of 
knowledge asymmetries between organizations goes beyond 
TCE, which assumes that the firm and the market have access 
to the same input factors and can create the same outputs 
(Conner 1991, p. 142; Demsetz 1988, p. 164; Williamson 
1992, p. 339). Indeed, the KBV of the firm is based on the 
assumption that under certain conditions activities that require 
the integration of knowledge from different sources can more 
efficiently be performed within the boundaries of the firm. 
"Firms exist because they can more efficiently coordinate 
collective learning than market organization is able to do" 
(Fransman 1994, p. 186). In particular, if organization 
specific knowledge is required to perform a task, using the 
external market becomes increasingly inefficient since an 
external supplier would first have to adopt this knowledge 
before being able to perform the task. Transferred to the IS 
offshoring context, this means that the client effort for 
transferring knowledge to an external vendor is particularly 
high if the required knowledge to perform the software 
development and maintenance work is highly client-specific 
(see Choudhury and Sampler 1997, p. 36). 
In order to compensate for the loss of value in transferring 
highly specific knowledge, the client may take over more and 
more of the specification (or even design) and at the same 
time increase the scope of specification, so that that the 
vendor is partially released from the challenge of under 
standing the client's unique business processes and infra 
structure (Mirani 2007). This process of knowledge substitu 
tion, however, is proposed to be inefficient when highly 
specific knowledge is involved, since it is difficult to exter 
nalize such tacit knowledge (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 
478). This results in the following propositions, which are 
complementary to TCE: 
Proposition 2: The higher the level of required 
client-specific knowledge in an offshored software 
project, the higher are the client's costs for 
(a) knowledge transfer and (b) specification and 
design. 
It can also be argued that if a high level of client-specific 
knowledge is required in a software project, control and co 
ordination costs may increase for the client, independent of 
the threat or presence of opportunistic behavior of the vendor 
(Conner 1991; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Foss 1993). 
Critics of TCE have argued that in many situations the vendor 
may not be able to afford behaving opportunistically, because 
"over the long run, the invisible hand [market mechanism] 
deletes actors who are habitually opportunistic" (Hill 1990, p. 
503). Opportunistic behavior may destroy the vendor's repu 
tation for a long time and prevent the vendor from conducting 
ongoing business with the client (Fama 1980, p. 505). 
While TCE argues that transaction costs would be nonexistent 
in the absence of opportunism, the KBV of the firm holds that 
there may be situations where knowledge transfer between 
client and vendor is necessary but difficult to achieve. In the 
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case of high knowledge specificity, the vendor may struggle 
to deliver the expected product or service simply because it 
lacks the client-specific knowledge. The consequence would 
be that the client spends a lot of effort constantly monitoring 
the process and product quality of the vendor. Moreover, if 
knowledge about idiosyncratic client resources (including 
business processes and/or software systems) is required, there 
is often a high level of project uncertainty, both regarding the 
required inputs to the project (e.g., requirements and amount 
of resources) as well as the output of the process (e.g., the 
quality of the software) (Nidumolu 1995). A vast amount of 
control and coordination is therefore necessary to ensure 
adequate service and product quality (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003) in spite of the absence of opportunistic 
vendor behavior (Conner and Prahalad 1996). Accordingly, 
the following rival propositions to TCE are put forth: 
Proposition 3: The higher the level of required 
client-specific knowledge in an offshored software 
project, the higher are the client's costs for (a) con 
trol and (b) coordination independent of the pre 
sence or threat of opportunistic behavior of the 
vendor. 
Both propositions 2 and 3 are implicitly based on the assump 
tion that external vendors generally lack client-specific 
knowledge and have equal capabilities to absorb that knowl 
edge. This, however, contradicts the basic assumption of the 
KBV that firms generally differ in their resources and capa 
cities. In line with evolutionary theory, a firm can be concep 
tualized as a bundle of routines and as a historical entity 
whose productive knowledge is the result of an experience 
based learning process (Nelson and Winter 1982). Since all 
firms go through different learning processes, they are able to 
develop distinctive capabilities and identities (Knudsen 1995). 
Considering that offshore vendors generally differ in their 
prior experiences, their ability to absorb client-specific 
knowledge likely varies. 
Absorptive capacity reflects the "ability to utilize outside 
knowledge" (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 128). This capa 
city, which is also referred to as creativity capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990, p. 131), "is largely a function of the level 
of prior related knowledge" (p. 128). In software develop 
ment and maintenance projects, prior knowledge means 
having gained experience in similar projects?ideally with the 
same customer, the same technology, and the same type of 
business processes (Ethiraj et al. 2005; Gopal et al. 2002). 
Thus, if the absorptive capacity of a vendor is low, knowledge 
transfer costs will likely increase for the client. In a like vein, 
specification costs will increase in the absence of vendor 
absorptive capacity, since the client may prefer to take over 
part of the specification directly, therefore increasing costs. 
Finally, control and coordination costs as a result of knowl 
edge asymmetry will also decrease with a higher level of 
absorptive capacity of the vendor. Accordingly, the following 
effect is proposed: 
Proposition 4: The higher the level of absorptive 
capacity of the vendor, the lower are the client's 
extra costs. 
As noted before, prior experiences are particularly important 
if there is a high need for absorbing client-specific knowl 
edge, which is the case in particular if a software project 
requires a high amount of client-specific knowledge. How 
ever, even if absorptive capacity is high, extra costs may still 
arise to a certain extent if very idiosyncratic knowledge has to 
be adopted by the vendor. That is, the negative impact of 
vendor absorptive capacity on client extra costs will be 
weaker as the degree of required client-specific knowledge 
increases. This moderating impact of asset specificity on the 
effect of absorptive capacity (proposition 5) is illustrated in 
Table 2. 
Proposition 5: The negative impact of vendor ab 
sorptive capacity on client extra costs will be moder 
ated by level of required client-specific knowledge. 
Impact of Offshore-Specific Factors 
Offshore outsourcing, as compared to domestic outsourcing, 
brings about unique challenges. Those challenges may arise 
from cultural differences (Krishna et al. 2004; Rao 2004), 
geographic distance (Carmel and Agarwal 2002; Rao 2004) 
and languages barriers (Apte 1990; Rao 2004; Zatolyuk and 
Allgood 2004) between the client and the vendor country. 
Furthermore, time zone differences as well as specific institu 
tional features of offshore countries, such as infrastructure, 
security, political conditions, and intellectual property regula 
tions within the offshore country, have to be taken into 
account when entering and managing an offshore outsourcing 
arrangement (Apte 1990; Hirschheim et al. 2005; Rao 2004; 
Rottman and Lacity 2004). All of these challenges are 
offshore-specific because they result from the fact that the 
vendor is located in a country or geographical region different 
from that of the client organization. Each of these factors 
implies a certain type of distance between client and vendor. 
Thus, taken together, they may be referred to as different 
categories of offshore-specific client-vendor distance mea 
surers (Carmel and Agarwal 2001; Gopal et al. 2003; Heeks 
et al. 2001; Kliem 2004; Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and 
Sahay 2001). 
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Table 2. Interaction Between Client-Specific Knowledge and Absorptive Capacity 
Degree of Client-Specific Knowledge 
High Medium Low 
i_p u ** ^ i i * * > Low to medium level of 
High Medium level of extra costs Low level of extra costs 
Level of_extra costs_ 
Absorptive ?_, ,. Medium to hiqh level of AM ,. , , r Low-medium level of extra ^ . Medium ^ Medium level of extra costs 
Capacity of extra costs costs 
Vendor Medium to hiqh level of Low Hiqh level of extra costs Medium level of extra costs 
extra costs 
From these offshore-specific factors, the first three, namely 
cultural and geographic distance as well as languages barriers, 
can directly affect the quality and ease of interaction between 
client and vendor. The most obvious challenges are language 
barriers (Rao 2004). If the client and the vendor speak 
different languages, communication becomes difficult. This 
hampers knowledge transfer between client and vendor and 
increases the likelihood of false specification due to mis 
understandings (Apte 1990). Similarly, control and coordi 
nation costs will likely increase, since they rely on effective 
communication which is aggravated through language 
differences. 
In terms of geographic distance it may be argued that 
communication technologies, such as video conferencing and 
e-mail and groupware tools that support virtual collaborative 
work, increasingly substitute the need for physical presence 
(Clemons et al. 1993). However, considering the nature of 
software development and maintenance as social actions, 
physical meetings are still an issue (Apte 1990; Cramton and 
Webber 2005; Olson and Olson 2000). This is particularly 
true if a high amount of firm-specific knowledge is involved. 
This often requires the transfer of tacit knowledge (e.g., if 
knowledge about unique business processes needs to be 
adopted by the vendor). Tacit knowledge is best acquired 
through a process of socialization (Nonaka 1994) via face-to 
face meetings (Nonaka and Konno 1998); the same applies to 
specification tasks. Specification requires a process of exter 
nalization where tacit knowledge is codified in the form of 
functional requirements which then need to be internalized by 
the software designers and programmers. Again, these pro 
cesses frequently require socializing action between client and 
vendor personnel (Scarbrough 1998). Geographic distance 
makes such face-to-face meetings more difficult and costly, 
which may increase extra costs. 
Finally, cultural distance can increase information acquisition 
costs (Kogut and Singh 1988) and hence increase the cost for 
all processes where information exchange is required. 
Cultural distance may be broken down into two components. 
Basically, cultural differences refer to the extent to which the 
members of two distinct groups (such as client and vendor 
personnel from different countries) differ on one or more 
cultural dimensions, that is, their shared values, norms, beliefs 
and assumptions that help them organize and structure the 
world (based on Roberts and Wasti 2002, p. 545). These 
shared norms and values of a social group serve as generally 
accepted patterns of behavior and hence influence the 
behavior of the members of a social group (Keller 1982, p. 
117; Murdock 1940, p. 366). Accordingly, culturally affected 
behavioral differences or clashes may be observed when two 
cultural groups work together, as is the case in offshore out 
sourcing. Case studies on offshoring from Anglo-American 
countries to India, for example, indicate that opposing atti 
tudes toward authority, hierarchy, and power may cause dif 
ferences in criticism and feedback behavior between client 
and vendor personnel (Heeks et al. 2001, p. 57; Krishna et al. 
2004, p. 65; Nicholson and Sahay 2001, p. 36). These 
culturally induced differences in the behavior of the offshore 
vendor necessitate costly counterreactions by the client, such 
as increased specification effort for avoiding misunder 
standings on the vendor side, increased effort for knowledge 
transfer, more control effort for uncovering misunder 
standings early on in the process, and increased coordination 
effort for enabling and ensuring smooth communication and 
interaction.8 This leads to the following proposition: 
8The direct impact of cultural distance on cost add-ons is consistent with 
previous literature that examined the moderating link of cultural differences 
on the relationship between asset specificity and low as opposed to high 
control modes in foreign investments (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988). In these studies, it was argued that cultural differences 
increase the information acquisition costs in monitoring and coordination, 
which influence the firm's propensity toward low versus high control modes 
in foreign countries. 
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Proposition 6: Offshore-specific client-vendor 
distance due to cultural differences, geographic 
distance and languages barriers increases the level 
of extra costs for the client. 
The client's increase in extra costs due to offshore-specific 
distance between client and vendor, however, may not be 
similar in all offshored software projects. In projects where 
little direct interaction between client and vendor personnel is 
needed, cultural differences, geographic distance, and lan 
guage differences may not be a large issue. This is parti 
cularly likely if little client-specific knowledge is required by 
the offshore vendor. Accordingly, the following moderating 
impact of client-specific knowledge is proposed: 
Proposition 7: The impact of distance in culture, 
geographic location, and language between client 
and vendor on the level of client extra costs is higher 
in software projects that require a high level of 
client-specific knowledge. 
Institutional differences will not be factored into our theo 
retical frame. These differences include factors such as legal 
differences or political stability. Since these factors play a 
particularly important role for contracting or vendor/country 
choice, rather than for the actual service delivery, they will 
not be further considered for this study. As far as knowledge 
about legal systems and regulations of the client country is 




For scrutinizing the theoretical framework on extra costs, a 
multiple case study approach was chosen (Miles and Huber 
man 1994; Stake 2006; Yin 2003). This approach seemed to 
be particularly appropriate for answering our main research 
questions on how and why extra costs differ between 
offshored software projects (Benbasat et al. 1987; Yin 2003). 
The utilization of the case research methodology follows a 
widely recognized positivist research approach which intends 
to provide valuable insights into proposed interactions (Dube 
and Pare 2003). The testing of a priori specified propositions 
is not meant to imitate a survey-based procedure where the 
objective is to gather as many data points as possible for each 
variable of the theoretical model in order to increase the 
statistical generalizability across a larger population (sam 
pling logic, Yin 2003, p. 48). Rather, the objective of the 
chosen multiple case study approach is to treat each case as a 
separate test of the theoretical frame in order to achieve an 
analytic generalization of our model (Yin 2003, p. 32) in 
which previously developed theory is used as a template that 
will be compared against the empirical results of the case 
studies. In this context, the generalizability will be achieved 
through replication logic in which each case is comparable to 
a new experiment. 
Due to the fact that the constructs and relationships would 
have been difficult to access in a quantitative manner, the case 
study approach was deemed particularly appropriate for 
examining the theoretical frame. This is particularly true for 
the dimensions extra costs and cultural distance. While it 
may have been possible to ask respondents of client organi 
zations to estimate the amount of time spent for activities such 
as knowledge transfer or specification, an approach that does 
not force respondents into prespecified dimensions, but rather 
allows for the importance of each dimension to emerge from 
the analysis and interpretation of the respondents' epilogues 
and statements about problems, difficulties, and extra effort 
that they experienced during the offshore endeavor, was pre 
ferred (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 213). The qualitative 
approach also left room for theory extension in an exploratory 
manner through identifying the underlying issues and themes 
of broadly defined constructs such as cultural distance as well 
as for identifying additional constructs that may complement 
the original framework (e.g., Brown 1997).9 
Sampling and Data Collection 
A purposeful sampling strategy was pursued in order to stay 
in line with the research objectives and the multiple case 
study design (Quinn Patton 2002). In order to control for 
potential bias of organizational culture (Hofstede 1980), a 
single research site was chosen which represents a German 
based internationally operating financial services provider 
with several years of experience with both domestic and off 
shore outsourcing. For reasons of anonymity, this organiza 
tion is named FINANCE. Together with two top management 
representatives of FINANCE that are responsible for the 
firm's organization-wide offshore strategy, six projects were 
9Ideally, any theory building attempts from case studies should be unbiased 
by a priori theoretical perspectives or propositions (Eisenhardt 1989). 
However, in our study we thought to combine the merits of a theory testing 
with a theory building approach in the same spirit in which it is proposed as 
useful to combine positivist with interpretive approaches when studying 
organizational phenomena (Cavaye 1996; Lee 1991). This dual approach is 
consistent with the multiple case study analysis procedure: "In either 
approach [inductive or deductive], the initial version [causal network or 
theory] is amended and refined as it is tested against empirical events and 
characteristics" (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 155). 
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selected from a database of the company's sourcing manage 
ment unit. To increase homogeneity and comparability 
between the projects, the projects were required to fulfill the 
following criteria: 
only non-captive offshore projects with Indian vendors 
only ongoing projects that were initiated at around the 
same time 
only projects with approximately the same size 
only projects that were organized similarly, in that a 
combination of onsite and offshore presence of the 
vendor was agreed in the contract 
The projects (i.e., cases) were chosen for enabling theoretical 
and literal replications (Yin 2003, p. 47). In order to ensure 
theoretical replication, at least two projects with high extra 
costs and two projects with relatively low extra costs were 
included. The perceived overall economic success of the 
projects from the perspective of top management represen 
tatives were used as an initial approximate value for the over 
all level of extra costs in each project. Each group of projects 
could then be used for literal replication by examining 
whether projects with the same level of extra costs showed the 
same theoretically proposed conditions. This selection proce 
dure resulted in six offshore projects with Indian vendors 
(three software development and three maintenance projects). 
An overview of the projects is provided in Table 3. 
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the offshore out 
sourcing projects and to avoid key informant bias (Kumar et 
al. 1993), we followed a multiple informants design involving 
key members of each project (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 
2003). We interviewed several stakeholders of each project: 
the project manager, one or two team members (from the 
client team), at least one member from the vendor's team 
(onsite coordinator, relationship manager, or offshore coordi 
nator), and also involved process owners (business respon 
sibles) wherever possible. The interviews were based on 
interview guidelines with semi-structured, open-ended ques 
tions, including questions about general project information 
as well as questions regarding the constructs of our theoretical 
framework. The interview guidelines were tailored to the 
different roles that the interviewees had in the projects. A 
high-level interview guideline is provided in Appendix B. In 
total, 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted by the 
first author and a research scholar. The interviews were open 
ended and took between 1 and 3 hours. Most interviews were 
approximately 2 hours in length. The interview language was 
German for all FINANCE interviewees (except for one pro 
ject manager with a Spanish background) and English for all 
vendor interviewees. All interviews were face-to-face, except 
for one interview with an offshore project leader, which took 
place via conference call to India. Table 4 provides an over 
view of the projects and the corresponding interviewees. 
Data Analysis Procedure 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The tran 
scripts from the 27 interviews were aggregated into a case 
protocol which comprised 198,996 words and 225 pages of 
text. The projects were encoded and structured using the soft 
ware NVivo. The coding procedure was done as follows: 
First, in order to mitigate potential bias, the second author 
who had not taken part in the interviews read and coded the 
interview transcripts by identifying text passages that in 
cluded information about the constructs of the theoretical 
framework. This process resulted in a table of 285 text 
passages and 348 codings since some of the citations provided 
information about more than one particular dimension. A new 
construct, "vendor personnel turnover," emerged as an 
important theme throughout the process of data collection and 
analysis. It represents an additional vendor characteristic that 
influences extra costs and hence was incorporated into our 
framework in an exploratory manner.10 Following the coding 
by the second author, the first author likewise coded the tran 
scripts. The comparison of the two codings resulted in an 
average inter-coder reliability of 85 percent according to 
Holsti (1969). The two coders then examined the mismatched 
coding and agreed on a final coding matrix that was used for 
the data analysis. The reasons for mismatches were always 
very obvious (e.g., in that one coder had simply overlooked 
an issue within a statement). Only in two cases was the third 
author called in as a referee. 
For the purpose of literal and theoretical replication, the 
instances of the theoretical constructs were determined for 
each project whenever possible, for example, for the con 
structs "required client-specific knowledge" and "level of 
extra costs" (high, medium, low). This will be shown in 
detail in the "Case Findings" section and the "Explaining 
Variations in Extra Costs" section. In order to increase the 
validity of our coding and data analysis procedure, we aggre 
gated multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2003), that is, 
multiple citations from different stakeholders were examined 
to determine whether a construct was rated high, medium, or 
low. Moreover, we attempted to increase internal validity by 
not only performing pattern matching between variables but 
also by considering statements that by themselves included 
causal linkages (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 144). 
High employee turnover has been reported as a challenge of offshoring in 
previous research (Carmel and Tija 2005; Lewin and Peeters 2006), but we 
did not anticipate it as having such a significant effect on our costs 
categories. 
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Table 3 . Descriptive Case Data 
FRONTEND (Development) CORPORATEPAY (Development) 
Project description One part of a large-scale project encompassing Development of a European billing system for 
the reengineering of FINANCE'S current account high value payments of corporate customers, 
system. This system was the firm's largest and This system enabled the business unit to bill 
most important IT system. The purpose of the their corporate customers with flexible condi 
reengineering was to consolidate two systems tions, for example, multitier conditions or 
into one new system in order to eliminate redun- rebates, 
dancy, reduce maintenance complexity, and 
lower the dependency on a few key people. 
Contract Fixed price Fixed price 
Resources Transition. 2/0 (client), 6/0 (Indian vendor), 2/0 Transition: 1/0 (client), 6/0 (Indian vendor) 
(onsite/offshore) (German vendor) Delivery. 1/temporarily several developers 
Delivery. 2/0 (client), 2/5 (Indian vendor) (client), 0/6 (Indian vendor) 
Quality issues Yes (lower quality than expected) Yes (lower quality than expected) 
Client extra costs High High 
WEBPORT (Development) INTERCHANGE (Maintenance) 
Project description Development of a financial portal by two Maintenance and support of a legacy payment 
vendors. A German vendor was responsible for platform for domestic and cross border pay 
the business requirements analysis while an ments. The software realized conversion ser 
Indian vendor took over design, coding, and vices for high value and bulk payments. First, it 
testing. The portal to be developed was meant was decided to offshore only the testing of that 
to provide information about capital market application, but later on, the entire maintenance 
products for corporate customers. and support operation was handed over to the 
same vendor. 
Contract Fixed price Fixed price 
Resources Transition. 3/0 (client), 3/0 (Indian vendor), 5/0 Transition: 7/0 (client), 3/0 (Indian vendor), 4/0 
(onsite/offshore) (German vendor) (external German consultants) 
Delivery. 3/0 (client), 1/20 (Indian vendor), 3/0 Delivery: 7/0 (client), 3/12 (Indian vendor), 2/0 
(external German consultants) (external German consultants) 
Quality issues Yes (lower quality than expected) Yes (lower quality than expected) 
Client extra costs Medium - low Medium - high 
SUBSIDPAY (Maintenance) CORPACCESS (Maintenance) 
Project description Maintenance and support of a software package Maintenance of two of the main applications 
that ensured the bulk payment processing in regarding electronic payments processing for 
one of the European subsidiaries. The applica- corporate customers which was previously 
tion processed transactions for local clearing outsourced domestically. One system realized 
procedures (i.e., credit orders and direct debits), the customer access, while the other enabled 
The core product was a U.S. standard software the customer administration, 
that was significantly enhanced and customized 
for the needs and requirements of the firm. 
Contract Fixed price Time and material 
Resources Transition: 3/0 (client), 9/0 (Indian vendor) Transition: 1/0 (client), 6/0 (Indian vendor) 
(onsite/offshore) Delivery 3/0 (client), 0/8 (Indian vendor) Delivery. 1/0 (client), 2/5 (Indian vendor) 
Quality issues Yes (lower quality as compared to in-house No 
maintenance) 
Client extra costs Medium - high_Low_ 
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Table 4. Overview of Projects and Interviewees 
Projects Development Maintenance 
Interviewees FRONTEND |cQRPQRATEPAY| WEBPORT INTERCHANGE | SUBSIDPAY | CORPACCESS 
PmjeCt 2 1 1 1 1 1 
manager 
Teamu 1 1 N/A 1 1 1 member 
"vendor 2 1 1 ~ 1 12 
Business _ 
responsible_ 
1 = number of interviewees; - = not available for interview; N/A = not applicable (i.e., this role did not exist) 
At this point, it needs to be noted that for examining the 
linkage between offshore-specific client-vendor distance and 
extra costs, as well as for analyzing the interaction effect with 
client-specific knowledge, we had to primarily rely on state 
ments by the respondents that explained the interaction 
between these dimensions. This is due to the fact that only 
offshore projects from Germany to India were examined and 
hence there was no externally caused variation in the explana 
tory constructs "language barrier," "cultural distance," and 
"geographic distance." Accordingly, no truly literal and theo 
retical replication logic was applicable for these relationships. 
Nevertheless, consistent themes emerged from our analysis 
about the impact of these dimensions on extra costs across the 
projects. 
Results ^ ^ l 
Level of Extra Costs 
A first look at the case data revealed that client extra costs 
were incurred in all of the projects to a certain extent. During 
the interviews, however, it became clear that the actual 
amount of time and resources that were required by the client 
for knowledge transfer, specification and design, controlling, 
and coordinating were not rigorously and consistently tracked 
by FINANCE. The business and project managers, for 
example, had no records of the number of hours per day or 
week they invested for supporting the vendor personnel. 
The time that we invest, what we have provided as 
an input from the business side?we had days with 
more than 14, 15, 16 hours of work?are not taken 
into account. (Business Responsible, WEBPORT) 
A business case was calculated as part of the 
sourcing strategy. However, from a business per 
spective, the impact has never been validated. 
(Business Manager, FRONTEND) 
We made our business case, but nobody has paid 
attention to this business case ever again.... We 
assume that what we have calculated or thought is 
what comes out at the end. Nobody is doing the 
tracking. (Project Manager, INTERCHANGE) 
We estimated the level of extra costs for each project based 
on our interview data. In doing so, we first searched for state 
ments about the extent to which the business case of each 
project was met, resulting in a total of 55 business case related 
quotes. This data gave us a first estimate of the economic 
success of the projects. The majority of these quotes clearly 
indicates that extra costs were largely underestimated by 
FINANCE, regardless of the method that was used to set up 
the business cases. This is exemplified by the following 
quotes: 
We had a budget increase, since FINANCE em 
ployees had to support the vendor at times when the 
vendor should have been working things out on their 
own....The result was that the assumption in the 
business case that the vendor would do 60percent of 
the work turned out to be the other way around, 70 
percent FINANCE and 30 percent vendor. (Busi 
ness Responsible, FRONTEND) 
We needed three more people from our side. 
(Project Manager, CORPORATEPAY) 
Apparently, we have to invest more time. And time 
is money. (Business Responsible, WEBPORT) 
Our engagement and commitment is very high. And 
without this special commitment, this professiona 
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lism and this technical know-how, it would not have 
been possible. (Project Manager, INTERCHANGE) 
Extra costs were incurred during the set-up phase. 
(Project Manager, SUBSIDPAY) 
One important additional piece of information is the extent to 
which the client was satisfied with the quality of the vendor 
performance (in particular software, i.e., solution quality); as 
long as the quality had not yet met the client's expectations, 
the project continued on, surpassing deadlines and creating 
additional costs related to managing the vendor (see Table 3). 
To elaborate on (i.e., isolate) the actual extra costs of each 
project, we analyzed the specific statements on costs for 
knowledge transfer, specification and design, control, and co 
ordination. Examples from the cases are provided in Table 5. 
Based on this analysis, authors one and two independently 
determined the level of extra costs (low, medium or high) for 
each project, with the third author serving as a referee in case 
of different classification (only two instances). This resulted 
in an estimation of extra costs incurred in each case (see 
Table 6). 
In order to increase our confidence level in our base estimate, 
we performed a simple plausibility check. We counted the 
number of quotes for each project and cost category (Miles 
and Huberman 1994, p. 213), divided by the number of total 
cost-related quotes and the number of interview participants 
for each project (see Sherif et al. 2006). Vendor interviews 
were not considered in this calculation, since the vendors' 
team members could hardly provide information about 
additional effort that had to be incurred on the client side. 
This calculation is shown in Table 7. 
(1) Frequency. As can be inferred from Table 7, the relative 
number of quotes for extra costs mostly corresponds with 
our estimate from the content analysis of the quotes. The 
projects FRONTEND and CORPORATEPAY show the 
highest number of quotes, followed by SUBSIDPAY. 
WEBPORT and INTERCHANGE are in the middle, 
while CORPACCESS ranks lowest. 
(2) Nature of costs. With regard to individual cost cate 
gories, the numbers show that costs for coordination and 
control, as well as costs for knowledge transfer and 
specification and design, occurred mostly in combi 
nation, except for INTERCHANGE, where knowledge 
transfer was the dominant cost category. Furthermore, 
two different findings emerged from the counting: In the 
development project WEBPORT as well as in the 
maintenance projects INTERCHANGE, SUBSIDPAY, 
and CORPACCESS, costs were incurred throughout the 
cost categories in a fairly equal way. In contrast, 
FRONTEND relied heavily on extra knowledge transfer 
and specification and design, while in CORPORATE 
PAY, extra costs for coordination and control were more 
frequently mentioned. Design costs were mostly in 
curred in FRONTEND and occurred to a small extent in 
CORPORATEPAY, WEBPORT, and INTERCHANGE. 
Taken together, our baseline estimate was largely met by our 
follow-up quantitative assessment, which increased our con 
fidence that our estimate of extra costs was valid. Notably, at 
our final presentation at FINANCE, the project managers also 
agreed with our appraisal of the level of extra costs in each of 
the projects, increasing the external validity of our analysis. 
Explaining Variations in Extra Costs 
Having identified the level of extra costs in each project, the 
next question to answer is why these costs varied between the 
projects (research question 2). 
Impact of Required Client-Specific Knowledge 
In the following, we analyze each of the projects with regard 
to the degree of required client-specific knowledge. Further 
more, we interpret the relation between the degree of required 
client-specific knowledge and the level of extra costs (Propo 
sitions 1,2, and 3). Table 8 exemplifies the classification of 
the degree of required client-specific knowledge for three of 
the projects. In line with Dibbern et al. (2005), required 
client-specific knowledge (i.e., asset specificity) was rated 
high when the development or maintenance work required 
knowledge about unique software applications and/or busi 
ness processes of the client. In contrast, if the application 
service provision primarily required general technological 
knowledge (e.g., programming capabilities) or industry 
knowledge that could be acquired without close interaction 
with client personnel, the required client-specific knowledge 
was rated rather low. Moreover, in software reengineering 
and software maintenance projects, required client-specific 
knowledge was rated high when the client applications that 
were taken over by the vendor had a high level of historically 
grown complexity and if it was difficult to understand the 
underlying logic of the programming code. 
From all projects, the reengineering project FRONTEND 
turned out to be the one with the highest level of required 
client-specific knowledge. On the one hand, it required an ex 
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Table 5. Extra Costs 
Case Exemplified Quotes 
| KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER | 
FRONTEND "We have to do an enormous amount of knowledge transfer. Somebody from here would already 
have this knowledge." (Team member) 
CORPORATEPAY "The knowledge transfer was very intense." (Project manager) 
INTERCHANGE "My team members, my German colleagues, are saying, I have to repeat something one hundred 
times to the team members, why does the knowledge transfer not happen?" (Project manager) 
SUBSIDPAY "We had to explain the same things again and again where we would have expected them to explain 
things among themselves." (Team member) 
[ SPECIFICATION 
FRONTEND "They will still need someone from our side to help them consider what the front end could look like... I 
or what the problems could be." (Business responsible) 
CORPORATEPAY "The requirements have to be very precise....So in the end, we have done most of the work." 
(Project manager) 
WEBPORT "You have to specify precisely what is required or needs to be done." (Project manager) 
INTERCHANGE "You have to tell them, please use this template. Do it like this." (Project manager) 
SUBSIDPAY "We have to specify and pay attention to many more things." (Team member) 
I DESIGN | 
FRONTEND "We have to contribute a lot more in order to balance certain deficits, for example, conceptual 
deficits." (Team member) 
CORPORATEPAY "Not only do they need a proof of trust, they also need professional support." (Team member) 
[ VENDOR COORDINATION | 
FRONTEND "Although we are not directly involved in the programming, we have to guide the project very closely, 
which is very time consuming." (Business responsible) 
CORPORATEPAY "We manage the vendor, we allocate the work, and we take care of quality." (Project manager) 
WEBPORT "I have to do a lot of coordination, otherwise things would not happen at all or in the wrong way." 
(Project manager) 
"There is a lack of effective project management. Given that the vendor has the highest level [CMM] 
certification, it is unbelievable that I have to keep track of a project's plan and status myself." 
| (Project manager) 
CONTROL 
FRONTEND "This is a controlling issue. Even though we don't have to, we do a technical implementation in order I 
to be able to evaluate whether the vendor's solution is right or wrong." (Business responsible) 
CORPORATEPAY "The vendor needs feedback: What went wrong? And why?" (Team member) 
WEBPORT "I am permanently pushing and advising them." (Project manager) 
INTERCHANGE "Documentation, hands on sessions, flying over there, explaining them things, bringing people here, 
but at the end of the day, the only reasonable approach apart from all those things, you need more 
control and you need more dedication." (Project manager) 
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Table 6. Estimation of Extra Costs 
FRONTEND CORPORATEPAY WEBPORT INTERCHANGE SUBSIDPAY CORPACCESS 
Total high high low-medium medium-high medium-high low 
Knowledge 
tranS^er' 
. high medium medium medium-high medium-high low 
specification 
a a 3 
and design 
Coordination 
low-medium high low-medium medium medium low and control a 
Table 7. Extra Costs (Number of Quotes) 
FRONTEND CORPORATEPAY WEBPORT INTERCHANGE SUBSIDPAY CORPACCESS 
(1) Knowledge 
~ 
\ \ \ \ Transfer 
(2) Specification 9 2 5 13 2 
(3) Design 10 1 1 0 0 






(4) Coordination 4 4 2 32 2 
(5) Control 5 5 4 3 3 3 
Total (4)+ (5) 9 9 6 6 5 5 
Average (4) + (5)* 1.5 4.5 2.0 2.0 2.5 1.7 
Total 39 13 16 14 12 9 
Average*_^5_6J5_^3_4J_<U)_3.0 
*Average = Total number of quotes/Number of interviewed FINANCE employees 
Table 8. Required Client-specific Knowledge 
Case Rating Quote 
FRONTEND High "Throughout the project, a great amount of business knowledge is needed. We touch a 
(Development) system that is older than 25 years, where a large number of business rules are 
implemented." (Project manager) 
"It is a highly complex system. You will not be able to understand it immediately." (Team 
member) 
WEBPORT Medium - "This is a portal. This is a purely technical project, actually. It is more technology than 
(Development) low functionality." (Vendor) 
"As I said, you should have a basic knowledge about the data that is displayed. Beyond 
that, you are not expected to understand how the rates are calculated." (Vendor) 
INTERCHANGE Medium - "The complexity we have is very high...I would say, 60 percent of the knowledge was on 
(Maintenance) high the paper and the rest of it was in the people's heads." (Project manager) 
"The system is very complex. We have technical people, and we have people who 
contribute their knowledge for the business analysis part." (Team member) 
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cellent understanding of the two prior systems that were 
custom-built over a period of almost 30 years; few key 
persons possessed knowledge about the system and under 
stood the structure. The system reflected business rules that 
even the business unit itself was not aware of anymore. 
Although the documentation was enormous, there were still 
gaps. The system was a unique application that reflected 
idiosyncratic organizational processes that needed to be 
understood by the vendor. Transformational business 
knowledge was needed since the new system should entail 
additional functionalities that went beyond the original twin 
system. CORPORATEPAY is in second position with regard 
to required client-specific knowledge. It primarily required 
client-specific business knowledge and a very good under 
standing of the banking market. Moreover, knowledge about 
FINANCE'S idiosyncratic IT landscape was needed for this 
project. INTERCHANGE was positioned in third place, rated 
medium-high in terms of required client-specific knowledge. 
The project started with handing over the testing to the 
vendor, followed by maintenance and support of a proprietary 
complex system reflecting processes that are unique to the 
bank. Although testing methodologies are generic and apply 
to all types of software, a certain amount of knowledge and 
understanding about the system's structure and processes was 
required. For the maintenance task, detailed knowledge about 
firm-specific processes and application flow was needed. 
Number four is SUBSIDPAY, also rated medium-high. The 
project involved the maintenance of a U.S. standard software 
which was extremely customized to a European subsidiary's 
needs. Firm-specific processes were thus reflected in the 
application and therefore needed to be understood by the 
vendor. The actual maintenance task, however, only included 
minimal software upgrades and changes. The degree of re 
quired client-specific knowledge is therefore rated as medium. 
CORP ACCESS ranks in fifth place, because little unique 
client knowledge was needed in this project; most of the 
process flows could be documented. The maintenance work 
load consisted of technical standard tasks, such as upgrades 
of the operation system version, the database version, or the 
programming language version. For these tasks, general 
technical domain knowledge was required and some unique 
knowledge about the specific standards that were used in the 
bank. Accordingly, the degree of required client-specific 
knowledge of the outsourced tasks is rated medium. Finally, 
WEBPORT was rated the lowest in terms of required client 
specific knowledge. For this development project, very little 
organization-specific know-how was needed. For the require 
ments analysis phase, the external vendor had to bring in 
knowledge about web portals in the business market and come 
up with some innovative design ideas. The software did not 
map any firm-specific process flows. Accordingly, among all 
outsourced projects to India, this one has the lowest degree of 
required client-specific knowledge. 
Having positioned each project on the required client-specific 
knowledge continuum, the next step is to examine Proposi 
tions 1 to 3, that is, to determine whether projects with a 
higher level of required client-specific knowledge actually 
showed higher levels of extra costs. For this purpose, we 
created a simple contingency table crossing the two variables 
("required client-specific knowledge" and "level of extra 
costs") (Huberman and Miles 1994). This mapping is 
illustrated in Figure 4. As can be inferred from Figure 4, this 
logic largely applies to the projects, supporting our reasoning 
that a higher level of required client-specific knowledge leads 
to a higher level of extra costs for the client. Deviations to 
this logic, as is the case for CORPACCESS, will be discussed 
in our further analysis. 
The next step is to examine the more fine grained TCE logic 
(Proposition 1) as opposed to that of the KBV (Propositions 
2 and 3). First, whether or not control and coordination costs 
arise for safeguarding against vendor opportunism when asset 
specificity is high (TCE) or whether they arise due to 
knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor (KBV) 
must be examined. Interestingly, we initially could not find 
any conclusive evidence that coordination and control costs 
were particularly high due to safeguarding against vendor 
opportunistic behavior (Proposition 1). The vendor staff was 
perceived as highly motivated and willing to make the 
required client-specific investments, even in the two highly 
client-specific projects FRONTEND and CORPORATEPAY. 
The problem was that even though the vendor tried very hard, 
the software quality often did not meet the client's expecta 
tions due the vendor personnel's lack of understanding the 
client requirements as well as the underlying business and 
application logic. Accordingly, the client invested much more 
time in error detection and functionality checks than expected, 
which led to higher control costs. When further examining 
the sources of the vendor's inability to deliver high quality 
software without significant client support, we found there 
was one issue that may be viewed as a form of opportunistic 
behavior of the vendor: the project staffing management of 
the vendor. The client often complained about the lack of 
experience of the vendor personnel (many of the team 
members came directly from university) as well as the high 
rate of personnel turnover (both issues will be taken up in 
detail in the next sections). It seemed that the vendor took 
little effort in staffing the projects with personnel with the 
right skill sets or in limiting the rate and the consequences of 
high turnover. This may be viewed as a form of opportunistic 
behavior, because the vendor should have informed the client 
about its problematic staffing situation before the contract was 
settled. The consequence was that the client eventually 
invested more time in the coordination of the project. To give 
an example: In one of the maintenance projects with medium 
high asset specificity, the project manager complained about 
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Figure 4. Relationship Between Required Client-Specific Knowledge and Extra Costs 
high coordination costs for finding skilled people that are 
motivated to stay in the project. The project manager put 
tremendous effort into engaging highly skilled team members 
and motivating them to stay in the project. 
It was a pain in the neck and I was selecting almost 
every team member, kept looking on their CVs, their 
experience, the way they react, the way they 
respond, whether they are serious or not, whether 
they are professional, whether they are too young 
people and not committed to this project...So I 
supervised the project very strictly. (Project 
Manager, INTERCHANGE) 
Still, an increase in extra costs for control and coordination 
was observed in the case data for those projects with higher 
specificity (Proposition 3). As our estimates in Tables 6 and 
7 indicate, this holds true for most of the cases. In COR 
PORATEPAY, a very specific project, management made 
strong investments in additional coordination and control. 
They even changed the operating model and decided to regain 
the lead for all tasks except programming, which was still 
done in India. 
We regained control, that is, we now govern the 
vendor, we allocate the work and we take care of 
quality issues. (Project Manager, CORPORATE 
PAY) 
In terms of Proposition 2, there was clear evidence that 
knowledge transfer and specification and design costs were 
exceptionally high when client-specific knowledge was 
required to perform the development and maintenance work 
(see Tables 6 and 7). The highly specific project FRONT 
END illustrates the need to support the Indian vendor in terms 
of knowledge transfer, specification, and design. 
We also thought that the Indian professionals would 
be able to analyze the program with their tools on 
their own, and to acquire the business know-how 
with the help of these tools, but that is also not the 
case. They highly depend on our help. (Project 
Manager, FRONTEND) 
Two cases show an exception to this logic: In INTER 
CHANGE, a lot of effort was mentioned for extra knowledge 
transfer, but very few statements referred to extra costs due to 
additional effort for providing specifications for the vendor. 
This may be explained by the fact that four external consul 
tants were initially hired during the transition phase to 
develop detailed specifications. Therefore, the challenge for 
FINANCE was to transfer the knowledge of this rather 
specific project to the vendor as detailed specifications were 
already available. CORPORATEPAY provides another 
exception, since specificity in this project was very high, 
while knowledge transfer and specification cost were com 
parably low. As mentioned above, CORPORATEPAY in 
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curred a large amount of extra costs for coordination and 
control, so they heavily relied on this kind of management 
strategy rather than investing in additional knowledge 
integration. 
The findings illustrate that an increase in extra costs may be 
explained by the KBV logic as stated in Propositions 2 and 3. 
By contrast, only little evidence was found for Proposition 1, 
which states that control and coordination costs arise solely 
for safeguarding against opportunistic vendor behavior. 
Impact of Vendor-Related Characteristics 
Lack of Absorptive Capacity 
Another aspect which persistently appeared in the case study 
was a perceived inexperience of the vendors' team members 
and their lack of creativity. Both were treated as indicators of 
the vendor personnel's lack of absorptive capacity. Consis 
tent with Proposition 4, inexperience of Indian team members 
led to higher knowledge transfer costs. Although the Indian 
vendor of FRONTEND had already worked with FINANCE 
in other projects, the German project manager realized the 
lack of domain-specific know-how and experience and hired 
two German consultants that previously had worked with 
FINANCE. The support of these two consultants was per 
ceived as very important and helpful for knowledge transfer 
and specification by the FRONTEND project manager. The 
initial idea that the offshore vendor would be able to 
understand the existing applications landscape by using its 
own reengineering tools was misleading. Additional knowl 
edge transfer was required for understanding the highly 
specific application logic. 
In addition to higher knowledge transfer costs, the Indian 
vendors' lack of absorptive capacity also lead to increased 
specification effort. Due to the Indian professionals' lack of 
creativity and the inexperience of young team members, the 
requirements specifications had to be very accurate for 
offshore outsourcing. 
/ get the desired quality for clearly defined pro 
cesses. This will be difficult or not achievable for 
work where I expect creativity from the [Indian 
supplier] firm. (Project Manager, SUBSIDPAY) 
The business unit decided to develop a "storyboard 
" 
as we realized: We had to add things so the Indian 
professionals were able to better understand things, 
because they didn't ask questions. And if they asked 
questions it was obvious that they lacked under 
standing of the functionality of the webpage. 
(Business Manager, WEBPORT) 
Thus, in cases where knowledge transfer was difficult to 
achieve due to the vendor's lack of absorptive capacity, the 
client invested in knowledge substitution by specifying 
requirements at a high level of detail. In other words, the 
client was forced to take over work that was originally 
covered by the contract and hence the responsibility of the 
vendor. Particularly in the highly client-specific project 
FRONTEND, the vendor was not able to deliver without 
some internal team members taking over tasks that were 
planned to be part of the vendor's responsibility. Internal 
team members not only invested in requirements specification 
but also in software design far beyond what had been 
expected. For FRONTEND, internal team members had to fly 
to India in order to help execute the testing. In CORPOR 
ATEPAY, some design costs were incurred as well. Internal 
programmers were sent to India to have a look at the source 
code and to technically support the team. This additional 
support by the client was necessary because of the vendor's 
inexperience and lack of required skill sets (i.e., absorptive 
capacity). 
In my opinion, you have to work closely together 
and observe very closely what work is being done. 
And this is why the 40:60 [onsite: offshore] model is 
really hard to achieve. Because in my opinion, we 
have to contribute a lot more in order to balance 
certain deficits, for example, conceptual deficits. 
(Team Member, FRONTEND) 
Increased coordination effort was another reaction of the 
client in responding to the vendor's lack of absorptive 
capacity. As soon as the client realized how critical it was for 
the success of the project to have experienced project 
members on the vendor side, FINANCE felt the need to 
actively participate in the composition of the vendor's team. 
This created extra effort (i.e., extra coordination costs). 
Because of these difficulties we have to invest in 
team building, which we underestimated. (Project 
Manager, FRONTEND) 
Control of a project's progress is another important issue. 
CORPORATEPAY showed that outsourcing the analysis 
phase and not controlling the results of the design phase may 
lead to severe problems. Due to the vendor personnel's lack 
of required business understanding, creativity, and experi 
ence, they often failed to fully grasp the business require 
ments and needs, which led to increased control effort for the 
client. 
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It is not easy to work with the vendor because you 
have to control each of his steps very closely and 
you have to make sure that the vendor understands 
the specified criteria. These are issues that do not 
come up in this way with a European IT colleague. 
(Business Manager, FRONTEND) 
You need certain control on the deliverables and the 
way they work and the way they organize them 
selves....You have to control what they are doing 
and supervise the results, also the way they have 
done things... .1 think the big challenge in this type of 
project is: you cannot compare the knowledge of a 
person that has worked on the application of 
SUBSIDPAY for 10 years with the knowledge one 
consultant can gain in 6 months or 1 year. (Team 
Member, SUBSIDPAY) 
Prior experiences with the client organization where mostly 
absent in the projects, except for FRONTEND and CORP 
ACCESS. In CORPACCESS, the vendor's project manager 
and one team member had formerly worked in a related 
project with FINANCE, which was perceived as highly 
valuable by the client project manager: 
The project leader had already been part of another 
FINANCE project. That is, he already had know 
how and was familiar with the entire applications 
landscape and its dependencies. And a colleague 
was transferred from the other team, which was per 
fect because she had a good background regarding 
the interfaces, and exactly this knowledge was 
missing in our project. (Team Member, CORP 
ACCESS) 
The following two examples illustrate the moderating impact 
of client-specific knowledge (Proposition 5) as shown in 
Table 4. In the project CORPACCESS, the relatively high 
absorptive capacity of some of the project members (see 
above) contributed to the relatively low extra costs in this pro 
ject in spite of the fact that a medium level of client-specific 
business process knowledge was required. In the project 
FRONTEND, the Indian vendor had also worked with 
FINANCE previously, but in very different projects (low 
medium absorptive capacity). Still, a large amount of extra 
costs was incurred in FRONTEND. The system to be reengi 
neered in the project was largely unique and required further 
transformational business knowledge. Consequently, the ven 
dor needed significant extra support to be able to understand 
the highly specific software, especially in terms of knowledge 
transfer, specification, and design. 
Overall, the case evidence shows that the offshore vendor's 
lack of absorptive capacity may lead to extra costs for knowl 
edge transfer, specification, design, coordination, and control, 
thus supporting Proposition 4. It is striking how the lack of 
absorptive capacity was associated with all types of extra 
costs that we had previously considered in our model. The 
findings also suggest that prior project-related experiences of 
the vendor led to lower extra costs, but that extra costs 
remained an issue in the presence of a high level of required 
client-specific knowledge, thus supporting the interaction 
effect between asset specificity and absorptive capacity, as 
stated in Proposition 5. 
Personnel Turnover 
A high turnover rate was one aspect that all maintenance 
project managers and team members invariably complained 
about, and that also occurred in one development project, 
CORPORATEPAY. 
Turnover is very high. (Project Manager, SUB 
SIDPAY) 
We had trouble because of personnel turnover, 
people disappeared. (Project Manager, INTER 
CHANGE) 
Almost every year we have a rotation of the current 
onsite coordinator because they want to return to 
India. (Project Manager, CORPACCESS) 
We struggled with the usual things such as extremely 
high employee turnover. (Project Manager, 
CORPORATEPAY) 
By contrast, in the development project FRONTEND, turn 
over was not considered to be too problematic. A possible 
explanation for this may be that the kind of reengineering 
work of FRONTEND appeared more interesting and chal 
lenging to the vendor's employees and was hence considered 
a valuable experience. 
Our attrition rate is 7 to 8 percent. This is much 
lower than the Indian average which is about 30 
percent. (Project Manager, Indian Vendor, 
FRONTEND) 
In my case, it is always the same people that I deal 
with. Therefore, I can say that I have really seen 
quality improvements and advances in learning. 
(Team Member, FRONTEND) 
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The Indian professionals were not shifted to other projects by 
the vendor. Since FRONTEND showed high extra costs in 
spite of the low attrition, it is likely that the level of required 
client-specific knowledge as well as the vendor's lack of 
absorptive capacity substantially override the effect of low 
turnover. Such moderating effects may need to be studied 
more closely in future research. 
When employee turnover was present on the side of the 
Indian vendor, it lead to increased costs for knowledge 
transfer because in-house team members had to re-explain 
and specify things for new entrants to the offshore team. 
The know-how transfer was intense. However, we 
were not able to benefit from this at all, because the 
people involved have left. There was one key 
person; she obtained valuable knowledge and was 
gone for good. (Business Manager, CORPOR 
ATEPAY) 
The coordination effort for integrating a vendor team in a big 
organization should not be underestimated either. 
Every time a new onsite coordinator enters the team, 
this is related with an incredible amount of adminis 
trative work: making sure he has passwords and 
access to a variety of systems. (Team Member, 
CORPACCESS) 
From the case evidence, we conclude that personnel turnover 
is a vendor-related characteristic that may lead to extra client 
costs. Taking a closer look at the phenomenon of personnel 
turnover on the vendor side, we saw the need to distinguish 
between two forms of personnel turnover that may affect 
offshore outsourcing projects. On the one hand, the offshore 
vendor himself may move resources from the project to which 
they were dedicated to another project where they appear to 
add more value. 
That was solved in a clever way by the managers in 
India. They act in a very pragmatic way, that's for 
sure. They know how to deploy their personnel in 
the right way. (Team Member, CORPACCESS) 
On the other hand, offshore team members may leave the 
offshore vendor for good in order to work for a different com 
pany or offshore provider. Both forms may be considered as 
types of opportunistic behavior. Deliberately moving project 
members to other projects is a practice that was explained by 
two vendors in the cases of SUBSIDPAY and INTER 
CHANGE. The vendor organization in SUBSIDPAY 
provides very experienced team members from so-called 
centers of excellence. After a certain period, they are re 
placed by less experienced local team members. The vendor 
in INTERCHANGE encourages its employees to gain 
experience in different kinds of projects. 
Typically, what happens in those engagements is 
that these Centers of Excellence provide the initial 
team which builds the local team and then moves 
out. (Vendor, SUBSIDPAY) 
The point is that you should get used to [personnel 
turnover]. You cannot ask a person to stay years 
and years in a project, since he personally wants to 
gain experience, he wants to go on and move to dif 
ferent kinds of projects. (Vendor, INTERCHANGE) 
Opportunistic behavior by individuals that leave the vendor 
organization for good may also cause problems for vendors. 
The project manager of CORPACCESS explained that Indian 
onsite coordinators that had spent a year in Germany like to 
return to India to find a better job due to the qualifications 
they obtained abroad. Vendors also highlighted the positive 
side of turnover, because it helps them to get fresh people into 
the organization. 
We need attrition [personnel turnover]. We do not 
want to avoid attrition. ...We need fresh people in the 
organization. (Vendor, FRONTEND) 
Thus, taken together, employee turnover?when present? 
caused extra costs for the client. This turnover can partly be 
interpreted as opportunistic behavior either at the individual 
worker or at the vendor level. It should also be noted that, on 
average, employee turnover was seen as relatively high in 
India, which is caused by the extremely high volatility and 
dynamics in the IT labor market of India. There are also some 
indications that the strong motivation of Indian employees to 
constantly learn makes it difficult for them to stay in one 
project, particularly when a project contains routine work and 
little intellectual challenge. 
Impact of Offshore-Specific 
Client-Vendor Distance 
From the three offshore-specific client-vendor distance 
metrics, only geographic distance and cultural distance turned 
out be significant cost drivers for FINANCE. Language 
differences were found to play a less significant role. Due to 
the strong international orientation of FINANCE, English was 
well accepted as a business language and there were few 
problems in understanding each other in the projects. Only in 
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the maintenance projects did the translation of extensive 
German documentation cause extra effort. Hence, language 
issues were not further considered in our analysis. In this sec 
tion, we will illustrate the offshore-specific and vendor 
related characteristics we observed in the cases. We will 
explain how those characteristics are related to the observed 
extra costs (Proposition 6). Furthermore, we will analyze the 
impact of those characteristics in the light of each project's 
specificity (Proposition 7). 
Geographic Distance 
Geographic distance and the resulting time difference caused 
increased client effort and time for coordination, control, and 
knowledge transfer. Several interviewees mentioned that 
complex and tacit issues in particular could be better ex 
plained face-to-face and that it otherwise took several rounds 
of conference calls and e-mail exchange in order to solve 
them.11 This has been confirmed both by vendors and clients. 
We do have communication tools, web conferences 
and things like that in place, however, with complex 
issues, face-to-face is a lot more efficient. You are 
able to reach much smoother and simpler solutions. 
This is what we have realized. (Business Manager, 
WEBPORT) 
Instead of sending a slide and explaining difficult 
things during a telephone conference, it would be a 
lot easier and faster to explain things on a piece of 
paper. That is why it is not a bad idea to have one 
or two people supporting the team onsite in order to 
clarify things that are difficult to resolve on the 
phone. (Team Member, FRONTEND) 
As a consequence, offshore personnel were often required to 
work onsite, which made it easier for the client to explain 
things and to work out specifications and design issues with 
the vendor. However, at the same time, client resources were 
necessary to interact with the vendor personnel onsite, and 
this again led to additional costs on the client side. 
Having them [offshore team members] onsite is 
associated with an enormous amount of costs. This 
eroded the original business case. In order to coor 
There was no evidence in the cases that time zone differences caused 
problems or extra costs. Moreover, in neither of the projects did FINANCE 
attempt a 24-hour development approach to actually benefit from time zone 
differences. In contrast, physical (i.e., geographic distance) was a large issue. 
dinate all this, I need three additional people at my 
site. This easily increases costs by 600,000 Euros. 
(Project Manager, CORPRATEPAY) 
Geographic distance thus caused additional costs for the 
client, supporting that part of Proposition 6. Moreover, the 
problems of long distance were particularly prevalent in the 
two most client-specific projects FRONTEND and COR 
PORATEPAY, since in these two projects it was necessary 
for client personnel to fly to India and support the vendor in 
the actual implementation and testing by providing very 
detailed design instructions. This illustrates the moderating 
impact of required client-specific knowledge on the link 
between geographic distance and extra costs (Proposition 7). 
When very client-specific knowledge was required, it was 
difficult to perform the knowledge transfer through electronic 
media or to substitute knowledge transfer by writing detailed 
specifications. The client actually had to collaborate with 
vendor personnel face-to-face. In FRONTEND, one team 
member even argued that it is necessary to have both client 
and vendor personnel working in the same office rather than 
next door. 
Cultural Distance 
Throughout the cases, the team members perceived obvious 
differences in the German and the Indian working culture. 
The Indian professionals strongly adhered to hierarchies and 
tended to implement prescribed specifications with little 
reflection. This corresponds with well-known findings from 
previous studies (e.g., Heeks et al 2001; Krishna et al. 2004; 
Nicholson and Sahay 2001). The Indian team members 
needed enhanced support and high social collaboration during 
the knowledge transfer because of the different learning 
approach and their high conformism. Feedback mechanisms 
were established in order to recognize misunderstandings at 
an early stage. 
We recognized [that] in the direct contact there will 
be no such feedback as "I do not understand. 
" 
We 
have to organize the feedback. That means we have 
to establish measures in order to oblige those who 
have absorbed information to re-explain it. (Project 
Manager, FRONTEND) 
Differences in the Indian working culture also increased the 
specification effort because of the Indian professionals' high 
conformism, the requirements specifications had to be very 
accurate. 
After having completed one phase, we had a bad 
awakening. The functional specifications [for which 
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the vendor was responsible] were inspected and a 
lot of gaps were identified. This is related to the 
Indian culture.... What they get as an input, they do 
not question at all. ...It is the mentality of the Indian 
professionals to always say yes and to scrutinize. 
(Team Member, CORPORATEPAY) 
We also observed that in terms of coordination and control, 
the internal team had to compensate for aspects such as the 
Indian professionals' tendency to not ask questions and clarify 
issues. 
We told them to come up earlier with partial results. 
We have had the experience that they worked for a 
long period of time on a document and then we saw 
that they had moved into a completely different 
direction. (Team Member, SUBSIDPAY) 
Basically, what they need is feedback: this is the 
right way, or no, that is the wrong way. (IT Unit 
Team Member, CORPORATEPAY) 
Organizing feedback is especially important in projects where 
the vendor is required to absorb a lot of client-specific 
knowledge. Since knowledge substitution by providing direc 
tions and detailed specifications may be hard to achieve in 
highly specific projects, it is essential that the vendor obtains 
a good understanding of the client's specific application 
domain and technical context. In the project FRONTEND, 
where ensuring that the vendor had sufficiently understood 
the highly client-specific application environment was critical, 
organizing feedback was especially important (moderation 
effect). 
It is a cultural issue, the Indian team members find 
it hard to say "Ihaven't understood, please explain 
this again "....Many of the presentations and ex 
planations we give [during the knowledge transfer] 
end up on a one-way-street, and misunderstandings 
only turn out when we ask the vendor to present 
what he has done.... This is the only way for us to 
find out how much has actually been understood by 
the vendor. (Project Manager, FRONTEND) 
The case findings show how cultural distance between 
German and Indian IS professionals may lead to extra costs 
for knowledge transfer, specification, coordination, and 
control, thus supporting Proposition 6. There also is slight 
evidence for the moderating effect of required client-specific 
knowledge on increased control and coordination costs due to 
cultural distance (Proposition 7). 
Other interesting findings that emerged from our cultural 
analysis include a misconception between FINANCE and the 
vendor about the role of culture. 
I think that cultural or linguistic problems are minor 
issues. Culture is not a problem, never. (Vendor, 
CORPORATEPAY) 
While the vendor in CORPORATEPAY did not perceive 
cultural issues as problematic, the FINANCE team members 
were well aware of cultural disruptions. They did observe, 
however, that some of the problems due to cultural distance 
were resolved over time, supporting the trust building process. 
Communication between the vendor and the German 
team members has evolved to be very trustful. The 
vendor now actively addresses problems. (Team 
Member, CORPORATEPAY) 
Discussion ^^H 
This study was motivated by the need to improve our under 
standing of why the economic benefits from offshore out 
sourcing vary substantially between projects. While previous 
literature has focused mainly on relationship management 
issues that should help to address the disruptive challenges of 
offshore outsourcing, this study focuses on the client extra 
costs that are caused by the constructive response of the client 
to these challenges. Our study shows that when offshore out 
sourcing knowledge work, such as the development and 
maintenance of software applications, extra client costs arise 
for knowledge integration activities including knowledge 
transfer on the one hand and knowledge substitution through 
requirements specification and design on the other. More 
over, extra costs for vendor control and project coordination 
frequently arise. The level of these extra costs was found to 
be influenced by three types of factors: (1) the nature of the 
knowledge work being offshored, reflected by the extent to 
which client-specific knowledge is required for task perfor 
mance, (2) the attributes of the vendor, reflected by the 
vendor's level of absorptive capacity and the rate of employee 
turnover on the vendor side during the project, and (3) the 
offshore-specific level of distance between client and vendor, 
reflected by geographic distance and cultural distance. The 
preceding relationships were based on the complementary 
theoretical lenses of TCE and KBV. The consideration of 
both theories led to a number of theoretical insights that will 
be discussed next. In order to provide a well-defined context 
for interpretation, however, we begin with highlighting the 
major limitations of our study. 
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Study Limitations 
There are several limitations to take into account. First and 
foremost, it should be recognized that the study findings are 
based on a single-site case study. The findings may be 
influenced to a certain extent by the overall corporate strategy 
and culture of the bank. We found a strong identification of 
the in-house project members with their employer and a 
strong commitment to work in the company's best interest. 
This may have increased the perception of cultural differences 
on the client side at the beginning of the projects. On the 
other hand, we could not identify any bias through possible 
connections between the projects. The projects were com 
pletely disconnected, the decisions were made independently, 
and there was little evidence that the management of the 
project was influenced by other projects. Second, it should be 
kept in mind that we only studied offshore outsourcing from 
a German client to Indian vendors. Thus, the offshore 
specific factors and their impacts should be treated with 
caution when studying other client locations or offshore 
countries. Third, the subjective rating of the variables by the 
authors may still be an issue, even though procedures for 
increasing internal and external validly were followed. 
Moreover, the fact that the researchers that were involved in 
selecting and analyzing the data were German or educated in 
Germany poses the risk of cultural bias. A final limitation is 
a potential bias in the answers of the interview participants. 
On the client side, we found this concern to be vitiated by the 
extremely open and even self-critical behavior of the inter 
view participants. This was slightly different on the vendor 
side, where the interview participants were more reserved, 
avoiding statements that could shed a negative light on their 
individual or the company's performance. 
Theoretical Implications 
Keeping the limitations outlined in the previous section in 
mind, our study offers a number of important theoretical 
contributions. 
Disaggregation of Extra Costs 
First of all, our study makes a contribution by disaggregating 
client extra management costs into more specific costs, 
including costs for requirements specification and design, 
knowledge transfer, control, and coordination. The distinc 
tion between coordination and control costs contributes to 
more recent claims of keeping these constructs separate 
(Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006; White and Lui 2005). It 
also acknowledges the demand for an explicit assessment of 
transaction costs and for examining performance implications 
of governance modes given certain types of contingency 
configurations (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, p. 47). The same 
applies for the consideration of knowledge integration costs 
including both knowledge transfer and specification (knowl 
edge substitution). These two types of costs extend the very 
one-sided consideration of transaction costs in TCE. Whether 
these costs represent participatory production costs of the 
client (e.g., "participatory design," Malone and Crowston 
1994, p. 95) or whether they present a new form of "cognitive 
transaction costs" (Choudhury 1997) remains an issue of 
debate. In any case, the results show that the cost categories 
are highly complementary in nature. Both control and coordi 
nation costs as well as the two types of knowledge integration 
costs were found to arise together, which reinforces previous 
findings on IT offshore outsourcing (Mirani 2007). When 
comparing control and coordination with specification and 
knowledge transfer, however, these costs arose rather as alter 
native strategies for managing the contract in two of the cases. 
The disaggregation of extra costs also allows for a better un 
derstanding of the theoretical impacts of the sources of extra 
costs. The examination of the rival lines of argumentation 
between TCE and KBV on the impact of asset specificity on 
control and coordination costs deserves special consideration. 
Exploring Rival Lines of Argumentation 
Between Theories: TCE Versus KBV 
While a number of proponents of the KBV have highlighted 
the fact that asset specificity could lead to market inefficiency 
independent of the presence of vendor opportunism (TCE), 
empirical evidence for that view rarely has been provided. As 
a second contribution, the results of this study show that in 
projects with a high level of required client-specific knowl 
edge, control and coordination costs can arise?not for safe 
guarding against opportunistic behavior, but rather for con 
structively reacting to knowledge asymmetries between 
vendor and client which are perceivably high in the case of 
high asset specificity. Moreover, knowledge transfer and 
specification effort was found to be particularly high in cases 
where the level of client-specific knowledge was rated high. 
This does not imply, however, that opportunism is irrelevant 
in offshore outsourcing. The project staffing management of 
the vendor could be viewed as a form of opportunistic 
behavior, which is taken up in the next section. 
Theory Extension: Offshore-Specific and 
Vendor-Related Characteristics May 
Cause Additional Client Effort 
The third contribution of this study lies in its differentiated 
analysis of the impact of certain offshore-specific (geographic 
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distance, cultural distance) and vendor-related characteristics 
(absorptive capacity, personnel turnover) on extra costs of 
offshore application software projects. The cultural distance 
between Indian and German project members can be traced 
back to differences in power distance between the two 
nations. Power distance refers to the extent to which less 
powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the 
family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. 
Cross-cultural research has shown that power distance is 
higher in India than in Germany (Hofstede 1980). In our 
projects, the high level of power distance in India was 
reflected in certain behaviors that have also been stressed out 
in research of Anglo-American origin (Heeks et al. 2001; 
Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and Sahay 2001), such as a 
high level of conformism (tendency to say yes) as well as 
obedience to and dependence on rules and obligations among 
Indian IS professionals. These culturally induced behaviors 
particularly increased the client's effort for specification, 
knowledge transfer, and vendor control. 
In addition to its high level of power distance, the Indian 
culture is characterized by a relatively high level of collec 
tivism (Hofstede 1980). This concept stipulates the formation 
of in-group behavior (Hui and Triandis 1986). Chen et al. 
(2002, p. 289) have argued that "collectivists typically draw 
the distinction between those they are personally related to 
(in-groups) and those they are not (out-groups)." This means 
that significant effort has to be invested in forming a common 
knowledge space (ba) (Nonaka and Konno 1998) until the 
Indian IS professionals?who together may form an in 
group?openly communicate and exchange tacit knowledge 
with German client personnel. The German team may indeed 
behave as an in-group as well?either because of the corpor 
ate culture or because of the national German culture which 
also has a slight tendency toward collectivism (Hofstede 
1980). Thus, similarity in the cultural dimension collectivism 
between two cultural groups may not automatically lead to the 
absence of cultural clashes. Rather, a process of convergence 
is required to form a collective of two distinct collectivist 
(in-)groups. The client's effort for enabling such a conver 
gence process causes coordination costs. Such costs together 
with control and knowledge transfer costs were also found to 
increase due to the geographic distance between client and 
vendor. 
In addition to the offshore-specific characteristics, two 
vendor-related offshore features were found to be associated 
with extra costs on the client side, namely the level of absorp 
tive capacity and the degree of turnover of vendor staff. Our 
study results showed that from all offshore-specific and 
vendor-related characteristics, the level of absorptive capacity 
of the vendor had the widest impact on extra costs. While 
absorptive capacity may be influenced by different factors 
(Lane et al. 2006; Malhotra et al. 2005), the results of our 
study suggest that prior experiences of the vendor personnel 
with related projects (e.g., similar technology and business 
processes) were the best indicator for a high level of absorp 
tive capacity. A low level of absorptive capacity leads to 
increased knowledge transfer effort on the client side and a 
higher need for detailed specifications. In two of the cases, 
the client even resigned and took over part of the design work 
of the vendor because the costs of specification and knowl 
edge transfer were getting too high. In addition, control effort 
to ensure appropriate software quality increases due to the 
vendor's lack of creativity in designing innovative and high 
quality software solutions. These findings go beyond the 
resource-based reasoning that vendor capabilities are critical 
for outsourcing success (Goles 2003). In line with the KBV 
of the firm, our findings suggest that, in addition to existing 
capabilities such as technical and project management capa 
bilities, the potential to absorb new knowledge is crucial. 
This is consistent with findings from previous studies which 
suggest that, in many outsourced projects, knowledge over 
laps between client and vendor are required, calling for 
knowledge exchange processes between both parties (Tiwana 
2004). 
What also appeared to be a severe problem was the degree of 
personnel turnover on the vendor side. Once the knowledge 
transfer which initially occurred onsite was completed, the 
vendor staff was often either transferred to other clients or left 
the vendor company for good. This then forced the client to 
repeat the knowledge transfer with the replacement staff 
which lead to increased effort. To avoid turnover, the client 
had to more closely observe the vendor's recruiting and 
personnel management, which lead to increased control and 
coordination effort. This finding is consistent with TCE logic 
that control and coordination costs arise for safeguarding 
against opportunistic behavior. When personnel leaves for 
good, this may be viewed as a form of opportunistic behavior 
at the individual level that negatively affects both the 
vendor's and the client's costs. When the vendor transfers 
personnel from one client account to another without 
informing the client about such intentions prior to entering the 
contract, this may be viewed as another, more severe form of 
opportunistic vendor behavior. 
Theory Integration: Interaction of Asset Specificity 
with Vendor-Related and Culture-Related Factors 
The fourth important contribution lies in theory integration by 
establishing a moderating link between the level of client 
specific knowledge and the impact of both general offshore 
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attributes and vendor-related characteristics. The level of 
client specific knowledge and the vendor's level of absorptive 
capacity were found to interact in their influence on client 
extra costs. For example, when both asset specificity was 
high (i.e., when a lot of unique process and/or software 
knowledge was required to perform the development and 
maintenance work) and the vendor's absorptive capacity was 
low, extra costs were found be particularly high. Addition 
ally, slight evidence was found that the impact of offshore 
specific factors (i.e., geographic and cultural distance) on 
extra costs was leveraged in projects with a high level of 
required client-specific knowledge. In projects with low asset 
specificity, such as the development project WEBPORT, little 
knowledge about unique business processes of the bank was 
required. Accordingly, a lack of absorptive capacity had no 
dramatic impact on extra costs. The vendor could mostly 
draw on standard knowledge about how to build a web 
interface following the specifications of the client. However, 
in the development project CORPORATEPAY, where a lot of 
profound understanding of the idiosyncratic billing processes 
of the bank was required, the lack of prior experience of the 
mostly young vendor staff caused a great amount of extra 
effort on the client side. This effort even increases if the 
vendor personnel are very hesitant to ask questions and to 
actively participate in the knowledge exchange process 
(impact of cultural differences). Moreover, the moderating 
effect of specificity was shown in the projects CORPACCESS 
and FRONTEND. In both projects, FINANCE had previous 
experience with the Indian vendors. As in CORPACCESS, 
the level of vendor absorptive capacity was high, only little 
extra costs were incurred despite the project's medium 
specificity. In contrast, the vendor in FRONTEND had less 
project related experience (medium) and had difficulty in 
understanding the highly specific system and business logic. 
Therefore, the positive impact of the vendor's absorptive 
capacity was overridden by the negative impact of specificity, 
thus leading to high extra costs. 
Future Research 
Resuming the previous discussion of the study limitations and 
its findings, a number of implications for future research 
emerge. First, our single-site research design calls for repli 
cation studies that use multiple sites in different industries in 
order to enrich the insight into the investigated phenomena. 
Second, it would be necessary to study our framework from 
the perspective of other cultures both from the client and the 
vendor side. For example, it would be interesting to examine 
whether cultural differences are smaller in nearshore arrange 
ments (e.g., between Germany and Russia) and whether this 
would lead to comparatively lower extra costs on the client 
side. Third, the formation of cross-national research teams, 
where researchers from both the client and the vendor country 
are included, may be a fruitful way to avoid national biases by 
the researchers and provide better access to informants of 
foreign countries (Niederman 2005). Fourth, although very 
demanding, a longitudinal perspective could yield further 
insight into the phenomena observed. For example, an evolu 
tionary study that examines offshore outsourcing costs over 
time associated with dynamics in the independent variables 
could reveal how transaction frequency and organizational 
learning influence the economic outcome of such projects. A 
number of interesting questions could be associated with such 
a design. Are offshore characteristics, such as cultural 
distance, a persistent phenomenon or do they disappear over 
time? Do offshore vendors catch up in absorptive capacity? 
Fifth, while looking at vendor absorptive capacity, another 
promising research approach would be to look more closely 
at the client. Which capabilities are necessary at the client 
organization and is the client able to positively influence the 
absorptive capacity of the vendor (Erickson and Ranganathan 
2006; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Tiwana 2004)? How 
can the knowledge transfer from the client organization to the 
vendor organization be managed more effectively? In this 
context, emerging tools for distributed software development 
or collaborative software development with substantial 
requirements engineering and knowledge management capa 
bilities could facilitate the client-vendor relationship, 
reducing extra costs in offshore outsourcing settings (Ciborra 
and Andreu 2001; Rus and Lindvall 2002). Finally, while our 
study has only focused on non-captive offshoring arrange 
ments, the question is raised whether captive arrangements, 
where the client holds part or all of the vendor capital, may 
help to overcome some of the disruptive challenges of off 
shoring without leading to significant extra costs on the client 
side (e.g., for managing employee turnover) (for a recent 
study of differences between captive and non-captive arrange 
ments, see Levina 2006). Incomplete contracts theory may be 
promising for examining the effect of ownership on residual 
control rights over vendor personnel (Hart and Moore 1990). 
Conclusion ^ ^ HHH 
Although many companies claim to realize significant cost 
advantages through offshore outsourcing of IS services, this 
paper suggests that there is a need for a more profound and 
differentiated analysis of the economic benefits associated 
with offshore outsourcing. While labor cost savings are a 
constituent factor in offshore outsourcing leading to produc 
tion cost savings, the findings of this paper indicate that 
additional types of costs may arise when software projects are 
offshored, which may offset initial labor cost benefits. This 
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paper has shown how TCE and KBV may be applied to the 
offshore outsourcing scenario in order to be able to under 
stand variations in client extra costs between offshored soft 
ware projects. Extra costs were disaggregated into different 
categories, and TCE and KBV were extended by including 
offshore-specific factors such as geographic distance and 
cultural distance between client and offshore vendor. Despite 
the limitations that we addressed at the beginning of the 
discussion, this paper is unique in the sense that it builds upon 
and extends two complementary theories of the firm that have 
rarely been jointly applied in the context of outsourcing or 
offshoring. The study makes a unique contribution to the IS 
offshoring and outsourcing literature in that it highlights how 
important it is to recognize the nature of the task being 
offshored when making the IS offshore outsourcing decision 
and when searching for appropriate responses in managing the 
specific challenges of offshore outsourcing. When a high 
level of client-specific knowledge is required for task perfor 
mance, the client is unlikely to achieve the desired economic 
benefits from offshore outsourcing?in particular when the 
vendor lacks prior experiences in the task domain and hence 
shows a relatively low level of absorptive capacity. Slight 
evidence was found that required client-specific knowledge 
leverages the offshore-specific challenges such as cultural 
differences and geographic distance. Future research should 
be encouraged to further examine the implications of various 
types of contingencies, such as the nature of the task, when 
searching for efficient strategies to capitalize on the benefits 
of the global division of labor. 
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Attributes Used to Assess the FINANCE Projects 
(based on Dube and Par6 2003) H^HH^^HHH^^HHHH^HHM^M 
I Research Design_ 
Nature of own study | Positivist, explanatory study with some exploratory elements (see also Lee 1991). 
I Clear research questions_| Yes._ 
A pr/or/ specification of Yes, due to explanatory character. 
| constructs_ 
| Clean theoretical slate_| No, propositions 
were formulated a priori due to explanatory nature._ 
| Theory of interest_| 
Transaction cost economics and knowledge-based view._ 
Rival theories included Yes, rival explanations of TCE versus KBV were examined regarding the impact of 
_| client-specific knowledge 
on control and coordination costs._ 
| Multiple case design_| Yes, 
one organization, six projects; every project represents a case._ 
| Replication logic_| 
Both theoretical and literal replication logic ._ 
Unit of analysis Six offshored projects which are well stated and well documented; the unit of analysis is 
consistent with the boundaries of the theories tested. 
A global German financial services provider has been chosen since it is an early mover 
in IT offshoring and since we wanted to incorporate a setting with a potential language 
_I barrier; 
for both countries, English is not the mother language._ 
| Pilot case_| 
Not conducted, since it is recommended for studies with a highly exploratory nature. | 
| Team-based research_| Yes._ 
Different roles of investigators First author and research scholar undertook data collection. 
Second author and first author coded and interpreted the data independently. 
I_I Third 
author reconciled coding and interpretation differences._| 
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Context Description 
Detailed site description Yes. 
Case period The case material was collected during a period of 6 months with several onsite visits 
and follow-up phone calls. 
Longitudinal design No, not applicable. 
Time spent onsite by the Yes, for setting up the case study design with top management and for conducting 
researchers interviews and for presenting final results. 
Nature of data collection Retrospective. 
Elucidation of Data Collection Process 
Multiple data collection Yes; data was solicited from different stakeholders via interviews; official project 
methods documentation from the client organization were fully available and added into the 
analysis. 
Qualitative and quantitative Qualitative only. 
data 
Data Triangulation Yes, for different stakeholders and sources. 
Case Study Protocol Yes. 
Case Study Database Yes, using the software package NVIVO. 




Questionnaires Yes, in the form of interview guides. 
Artifacts No, only examination of the software systems that were offshored. 
Time Series No. 
Sampling Strategy Combination of convenient sample and quota sample (three projects of IS development 
and three projects of IS maintenance). 
Elucidation of Data Analysis Process 
Field notes Yes. 
Coding Yes. 
Data displays Yes. 
Flexible and opportunistic Yes. 
process 
Logical chain of evidence Yes. 
Empirical testing Yes. 
Explanation building Yes. 
Time series analysis No. 
Searching for cross-case Yes. 
patterns 
Use of natural controls No. 
Quotes (evidence) Yes. 
Project reviews Yes. 
Comparison with extant Yes, especially with supporting literature. 
literature_ 
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Appendix B 
High-Level Interview Guideline ^^ ^^ ^^ l 
0) Introduction 
0.1 When did you become involved in this project? 
0.2 What is your task in this team? Which aspects do you concentrate on? 
1) Decision process and project characteristics 
1.1 Why did FINANCE choose to offshore this project? 
1.2 Which characteristics of this project make it suitable for offshore outsourcing? 
1.3 Which parts of the IS function remained in-house? 
2) Requirements and Realization 
2.1 How much domain or firm-specific know-how is needed for the outsourced task? 
2.2 How are requirements designed and communicated to the vendor? 
2.3 How many of the issues arising are due to incomplete or vague requirements specification? 
3) Transition phase 
3.1 How did the knowledge transfer take place? 
3.2 Who was responsible for providing the specifications? 
4) Delivery phase 
4.1 How is the internal and offshore team structure of this project organized? 
4.2 What are the main mechanisms for managing this project? 
4.3 How is your contract with the vendor specified and enacted? 
4.4 Are there misunderstandings? What are the main reasons? 
4.5 What are the main challenges in this project? 
4.6 Has something changed in the service quality since the offshore outsourcing arrangement? 
5) Outcome 
5.1 How was the sourcing decision evaluated? 
5.2 Were the expectations met? 
5.3 Did unexpected additional costs arise? 
5.4 Are you satisfied with the offshore outsourcing arrangement? 
366 MIS Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 2/June 2008 
This content downloaded from 130.92.9.58 on Mon, 28 Apr 2014 04:33:41 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
